Co-published with The Conversation:

Mike Pompeo (pictured) was angry.

The US Secretary of State stood in the United Nations headquarters in New York and proclaimed a new Axis of Evil between former American allies — the UK, France, and Germany — and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

They chose to side with ayatollahs. Their actions endanger the people of Iraq, of Yemen, of Lebanon, of Syria – and indeed, their own citizens as well.

So what prompted Pompeo’s outburst?

A very bad week for the US in the Security Council. On August 14, only the Dominican Republic supported the Trump Administration’s resolution for an extension of the UN arms embargo on Iran, due to expire in October. Russia and China voted No. The other 11 members, including the Europeans singled out by Pompeo, abstained.

Then the following Friday, 13 of the 15 members objected to the US attempt to invoke “snapback” sanctions on Tehran. Pompeo claimed that Iran was in violation of the 2015 nuclear agreement between the Islamic Republic and the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia). But everyone else — except for the Dominican Republican, who said nothing — countered that the Trump Administration had withdrawn in May 2018 from the agreement, so had no standing to demand UN sanctions.

On Tuesday, Indonesia, which currently holds the Presidency of the Security Council, said no further action would be taken to impose snapback sanctions, drawing further ire from Pompeo.

Hoisted by Their Hardline

The “snapback” provision was built into Resolution 2231, which underpinned the deal. If any of the parties believes another had violated the terms, then a dispute resolution mechanism can be activated. If there is still no resolution, then UN sanctions dating from 2010 can be reimposed.

But as of US withdrawal in May 2018 and unilateral, comprehensive sanctions in November, Iran was in compliance with the deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported at quarterly intervals that Tehran remained within the limits for production of low-grade uranium. The Rouhani Government, citing the US sanctions and failure to establish a European economic link to bypass them, suspended adherence to some provision from June 2019; however, Tehran has not returned to the pre-2015 production of 20% uranium, which potentially can be further enriched to military grade of more than 90%.

The other diplomatic challenge for the Trump Administration was that it had no wish, including through renewed UN sanctions, to return to what Donald Trump called the “worst deal ever negotiated” in American history. At the least, its “maximum pressure” on Tehran sought to condemn Iran’s regional operations in the Persian Gulf and in countries such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. Administration officials, spurred by right-wing think tanks and legislators, also aspired to break the Iranian economy and foster regime change through mass protests.

On January 3, citing rocket attacks by Iran-supported Iraqi militia, the Administration assassinated Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force responsible for Iranian military operations outside the country. The US drone strike, outside Baghdad International Airport, also slew Abu Mahdi al=Muhandis, the leader of the Iran-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah.

Iran’s calibrated response, with rocket attacks on Iraqi bases seeking to wound but not kill US personnel, limited escalation. So did the Revolutionary Guards’ mistake in downing a Ukrainian passenger jet, killing 176 passengers and crew including more than 100 Iranians, and its 48-hour lie trying to cover up the missile fire on the aircraft.

The Trump Administration drew the lesson that maximum pressure had to be stepped up with more sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities. US agencies also reportedly carried out cyber-attacks on infrastructure, and Israel used an agent to bomb a building at the Natanz nuclear plant.

Russia, China, the European powers, and almost all other Security Council members reached a different conclusion. They concurred that the deal had to be maintained to prevent further confrontation in Iran, the Persian Gulf, and throughout the Middle East and central Asia. In June, the UK, German, and French Foreign Ministers were blunt in their message to the Trump Administration:

We firmly believe that any unilateral attempt to trigger U.N. sanctions snapback would have serious adverse consequences in the U.N. Security Council. We would not support such a decision, which would be incompatible with our current efforts to preserve the JCPOA [nuclear deal].

Although it is not being said openly, almost every actor except Trump’s inner circle is awaiting his departure in January 2021 and the arrival of President Joe Biden’s Administration.

That will not bring a simple return to the status quo ante of the 2015 deal. A Democratic administration, both because of domestic pressure and concerns over Iranian military plans, will want some revision of terms; so will the Europeans, including over Tehran’s missile programs. Tehran will seek assurances against another unilateral US abrogation and for the removal of comprehensive sanctions. But a return to acceptance of mutual interest in a deal, and of discussions of regional matters, will shift the priority to negotiations rather than confrontation.

Why Did the US Go It Alone?

But this leaves the immediate question: why, given the inevitability of defeat on both the arms embargo and the snapback sanctions, did the Trump Administration push so hard and so loudly — and keep doing so?

One cannot rule out a miscalculation of arrogance by Pompeo. And, of course, there is Trump’s relative ignorance of US-Iranian relations and the region: even as his camp were shaking a fist of fury, he was talking about a high-profile photo opportunity with an Iranian leader.

But career staff in Washington will know that these are fantasies, given the reaction both of Tehran and of almost every other country with a part in the drama. So the baseline is Trump and Co., having shredded the work of the Obama Adminstration, want to box in any successor led by Biden. Their rhetoric of Iranian duplicity, menace, and support of “terrorism” seeks to raise the domestic bar for any resumption of talks, let alone a revised agreement. Republican allies in Congress, such as fire-breathers like Sen. Tom Cotton, and the right-wing think tanks will ensure that no treaty is possible and the glimmer of regime change remains. And that will put a mighty challenge to Biden and his officials: is there any prospect of an executive order, as in 2015, for a deal?

Meanwhile, the Pentagon, with support from other agencies, will look to contain the Iranians in regional affairs. Here they have the platform of Tehran’s actions, including by the Revolutionary Guards and regime hardliners: from the propping up of Syria’s mass-killing Assad regime to the contest for influence in Iraq to support of Yemen’s Houthi insurgency, including attacks on Saudi Arabia, to the alliance with Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

And one cannot rule a second Trump term. If his 27% chance of a November victory turns into 100%, then his Administration will pile on more pressure with additional unilateral sanctions, attacks on Iranian infrastructure, and threats to knock out Tehran’s commanders as they did Soleimani. The message will be clear: Concede or We Will Break You.

Barring the highly unlikely outcome of mass protests that overcome deadly suppression to change Iran’s leadership, Tehran is likely to reply: Try It. Even as the Trump Administration pursues its quest in isolation, that will turn the regional kaleidoscope into more collision and fragmentation, and force Iran’s people to endure more sacrifice for their leaders’ “resistance”.