A White Helmets colleague tries to help Mohammad al-Shahwa, mortally wounded in a pro-Assad strike on an ambulance in Idlib Province, northwest Syria, May 4, 2019
A new report says Russian and Assad forces have struck 31 civil defense centers and vehicles in northwest Syria since April 26.
The 25-page report from the pro-opposition Syrian Network for Human Rights sets out the provision in the Geneva Convention that mandates the protection of medical personnel in conflicts “in all circumstances”, as it reviews the killing of 229 civil defense personnel in opposition areas since March 2013.
Focusing on the Russian-regime offensive and attacks on civilian areas in Idlib and northern Hama Provinces, the SNHR documents the killing of four White Helmets rescuers and wounding of 22. Eight centers were struck — four each by Russian and regime warplanes — and 23 ambulances and other vehicles were targeted. Almost all of the strikes were in southern Idlib and northern Hama.
See also Syria 1st-Hand: War Crime — Russia’s Killing of White Helmets Rescuers in Idlib Province
In addition to the four White Helmets fatalities, three medics of the Violet Organization were killed by an airstrike on their ambulance in the town of Ma’arat al-Num’an on June 19.
Fadel Abdul Ghany, the Chairman of the SNHR, summarizes the attacks on the rescuers, violating international humanitarian law:
The tasks carried out by the Syrian Civil Defense teams (White Helmets) are diametrically opposed to the strategy of the Syrian regime and Russia of inflicting as much pain and fear in the community as possible. This is primarily why its equipment, headquarters and personnel have been subjected to deliberate shelling. Its reputation was also distorted by an attempt to link it to extremist organizations.
All those who kill and target those who assist and aid civilians must be condemned and exposed.
Syria Feature: These Are The White Helmets
The report summarizes that in almost 400 attacks since March 2013, the Assad regime has killed 159 civil defense personnel and Russia 38. The Islamic State killed three, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces one, and “other parties” 28.
The SNHR calls on the UN Security Council to support medical staff by holding attackers accountable, and for the international community to increase support for relief efforts.
Russian-regime attacks have killed at least 550 civilians, including more than 130 children, in Idlib since late April. More than 2,100 people have been injured, and at least 330,000 of Idlib and northern Hama’s 3 million population — about 20% of those remaining in Syria — have been displaced.
Despite the assault on civilians, the Russian-regime offensive has been unable to break resistance. It quickly took several towns and villages in northwest Hama but has been checked by Turkish-backed rebels and the Islamist bloc Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
“#Syria: as it seems pro-Assad forces are preparing for Ghab Plain Offensive (NW. #Hama), Rebels are detonating tonight last bridges still standing in the area.” – @QalaatAlMudiq
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I’m going to re-up what I posted here two weeks ago, it’s a comment about rebels drone strategy, see the first post:
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https://eaworldview.com/2019/06/syria-daily-regime-fails-again-hama-northwest-offensive/
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Excerpt from the above link “5) Why aren’t rebels combining their ‘drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases with ‘behind enemy line’ motorcycle/vehicle raids on regime depots?
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What do I mean? When rebels are sending their drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases what do you think the Assadists at the airbases do when they see those drones? Especially if those rebel drones are followed by rebel MLR attacks? The Assadists hide underground. When the Assadists hide underground during rebel ‘drone swarm’ attack or MLR attack do you think those Assadists will be willing to send troops to depots near the front-line? No.
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So why not launch both those ‘drone swarm’ attacks and MLR attacks on regime airbases on the same day as rebel groups launch motorcycle raids on regime depots round that regime airbase whilst the regime is distracted by those ‘drone swarms’?
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You say number 5 is stupid? Let me do the maths for you – How much 1 rebel drone cost to make? $200. How much does 1 ATGM cost? $5000. If rebels send 100 drones (i.e. ‘drone swarm’) to attack a regime airbase on exactly the same hour as rebel Inghimazi troops attack a regime depot near the regime airbase and capture from the regime 50 ATGMs then guess how much this would benefit? 100 drones = $20,000 cost, 50 ATGMs = $250,000 reward. Now tell me, if you were a businessman and someone told you that for a $20,000 risk you could earn $250,000 are you telling you won’t take that opportunity? An idiot wouldn’t so why not use ‘drone swarms’ to help you in your raids to get you more ATGMs?”
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And I say this too – just like rebels were able to turn the original regime ‘Ghab offensive’ into an outright destruction of regime tanks by controlling the heights (e.g. Mount Nabi Yusuf?) rebels will have control the heights around the ‘Ghab plain’ again and to do rebels will seriously have to empty that devils nest that is ‘Suqaylabiyah’. Rebels don’t need to capture and hold ‘Suqaylabiyah’. but rather capture and hold it long enough to booby-trap all buildings in ‘Suqaylabiyah’ so it will take the regime months to launch another ‘Ghab offensive’ again.
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Another thing about rebels drone design. The rebels in Latakia are on higher ground (in fact isn’t the highest point in Syria overall?) which means that the drones flown by rebels in Latakia don’t have to fly/take-off at such a high angle like the drones in Hama have to because Latakia is predominantly mountainous the take-off angle can be slightly lower to be able to fly far. Which means that the drones in Latakia can have longer wings then the drones used in Hama which in turn means those ‘long wing’ drones in Latakia can both – A) carry more munitions on them to use against the regime (e.g. see Turkey’s drones and note how long it’s wings are) as their would be more space to carry them on the drone. B) Drones with longer wings can glide more the higher they fly which in turn means rebels don’t have to use the GPS on those drones continuously (e.g. ‘long wings’ drones can use the GPS up until it reaches the Khmeeim airbase where it begins ‘gliding’ till it reaches its target) which in turn makes the Russian ‘drone defense’ system at Khmeeim useless because when ‘long wing’ drones get to Khmeeim and switch off their GPS and begins gliding into regime military aircraft from high altitude the Russians will no longer be able to use ‘electronic jammers’ to bring down those ‘long wing’ drone gliders and would be forced to use their weaponry against them. And guess what? If there’s a whole ‘drone swarm’ (i.e. 40 to 60 drones) of ‘long wing’ drone gliders the regime fighters won’t be able to bring them all down except a few and the ones that get through will cause havoc.
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One last point, if I were rebels in Latakia right now I’d send somebody over to Afrin to study how the YPG created their tunnels & underground hide-outs because Afrin is as mountainous as Latakia is and once those persons have studied those tunnels/underground headquarters then bring those underground tunnel/bunker ideas to Latakai so rebels in Latakia have a underground base as close as possible to Khmeeim airbase.