Rebels defending against an Assad regime attack in Hama Province in northwest Syria
The Assad regime has again failed to advance in its eight-week offensive in northwest Syria, taking heavy losses in an assault on a key hilltop in northwest Hama Province.
A pro-Assad blog, fed by regime military sources, acknowledged another loss in the attempt to take Tal Maleh, which overlooks a vital road linking regime positions in the province, and the nearby town of Jibeen.
The blog said between 20 and 25 regime troops were killed and at least three “vehicles” were lost.
Pro-opposition activists echoed the report, adding that rebel forces had destroyed regime armored vehicles with anti-tank missiles. One site claimed at least 50 regime soldiers were slain and more than 100 wounded.
#Syria: #NLF wiped out today with a #Kornet a BMP on KafrHoud front (N. #Hama). pic.twitter.com/esT18KqlS7
— Qalaat Al Mudiq (@QalaatAlMudiq) June 28, 2019
The Russian-regime offensive began May 6. In its initial days, the assault captured several towns and villages. But despite intense Russian airstrikes, the advance soon stalled. A counter-offensive by Turkish-supported rebels and the Islamist bloc Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in early June regained some of the territory, and lines have been static since then despite the regime moving in elite units from other parts of the northwest front.
The regime has tried several times throughout the offensive to seize Tal Maleh, but has suffered setbacks with casualties on each occasion.
Meanwhile, Russian and regime bombing and shelling has killed more than 400 civilians in neighboring Idlib Province, wounded hundreds, and displaced more than 330,000. Almost 30 medical facilities have been attacked, and several civil defense personnel have been slain.
See also Syria Daily, June 27: Rescuers and Civilians Killed in Russia-Regime Attacks in Northwest
Our heroes paid the ultimate sacrifice for their people. Their helmets have come off for the last time. We call for the world's support to keep our humanitarian workers out of the crosshairs..#WhiteHelmets #Syria #NotATarget pic.twitter.com/Icu3IqvoZM
— The White Helmets (@SyriaCivilDef) June 28, 2019
Journalist Hadi al-Abdallah reports on pro-Assad airstrikes on civilian homes after the latest failure to advance in northwest Hama:
There are an estimated 3 million people — about 20% of Syria’s remaining population — in Idlib and northern Hama, the last major opposition area in the country.
You wanna see how worried the Russians are becoming about rebel ‘drone swarms’? Not withstanding my above criticism on what ‘big room for improvement’ rebel need (so they can achieve more strategic goals and get more ATGMs) the Russians are getting so worried that according to this Israeli article the Russians are now using jammers so powerful it’s disrupting electronically everything as far west as Cyprus:
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https://www.timesofisrael.com/gps-jamming-affecting-israel-comes-from-russian-base-in-syria-us-researcher/
However there is a problem with the Russian method of ‘jamming’, it only works at low altitudes, so if those rebel ‘drone swarms’ fly at a much higher altitude on their way to Khmeeim airbase and loiter (i.e. stay at that high altitude once it reaches Khmeeim airbase) then ‘dives’ non-electronically when it reaches Khmeeim airbase (i.e. when it reaches Khmeeim airbase from a high altitude it then automatically switches off it’s GPS and dives/sinks down in the middle of Khmeeim airbase quickly) there’s nothing the Russians at that airbase can do to stop it, especially if it’s a ‘drone swarm’ (i.e. 100 drones diving with their munitions from a high altitude in the middle of Khmeeim airbase) especially if that ‘drone swarm’ high altitude on the same hour as an MLR attack on Khmeeim airbase.
“Russia lost another Orlan-10 UAV, this one fell over NW. #Hama front (Ghab Plain)” – @QalaatAlMudiq
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Rebels shouldn’t just bring them down, they should open those drones up and learn from them (e.g. it’s circuitry, it’s use of camera, design) and then apply what they learn (e.g. circuitry, launch platform design) on their own drones.
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But this brings back to a wider point I been making over a week. As I said before here’s the 6 chief flaws (7 if you include the above idea) I see with rebel’s drone use strategy:
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1) They are not using them in large enough numbers (i.e. they using 10 or 30 rather using 50 or 80 in one go) on the same hour. Why is this important? The fewer the drone rebels use on a single target the more easier it becomes for the regime/Russians to shoot them all down, BUT use 100 weaponised drones in one go (i.e. within a single hour) & the regime/russians won’t be able to shoot them all down.
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2) Those drones aren’t being combined with MLR attacks so combine those ‘drone swarms’ with MLRs & attack regime airbases using both drones & MLRs. Why? Because the anti-aircraft weaponry the regime/russians airbases use to shoot down a drone or stop MLRs can only concentrate upon one type of attack at a time (i.e. it can either only focus on the weaponised drone swarms or on MLRs but it can’t concentrate on both drones & MLRs AT THE SAME TIME) do both in either the ‘drone swarms’ will do alot of damage (because regime/russia too busy with the MLRs?) or the MLRs will do the most damage (because regime/russia airbase troops too busy with the MLRs?).
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3) The attacks of drone swarms aren’t being used to attack a regime airbase from multiple axis (i.e. from north & south or west & east) like rebels do with a tank attack. Why? If rebels launch a drone swarm attack from the west the regime anti-air base & soldiers can just move to the east of that airbase and hide their until the ‘drone swarms’ stop attacking, if rebels want to catch out as many regime troops as possible then have the rebels use their ‘drone swarms’ to attack regime airbase from multiple axis (i.e. from north & south or west & east) during such ‘drone swarm’ attacks that way rebels LEAVE NO HIDING SPACE DURING DRONE SWARM ATTACK and all the Assadists will get caught out.
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4) Why aren’t rebel ATGM teams following-up a hit on those regime airbases after rebel ‘drone swarm’ attacks? When rebels launch a ‘drone swarm’ attack on a regime airbase do rebels not realise that regime rushes their soldiers either out of such airbases after a ‘drone swarm’ attack and return those soldiers back again? So why isn’t there a ATGM team ready to pick-off/STRIKE with ATGM those regime soldiers when they run away from their airbase after a rebel ‘drone swarm’ attack?
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5) Why aren’t rebels combining their ‘drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases with ‘behind enemy line’ motorcycle/vehicle raids on regime depots?
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What do I mean? When rebels are sending their drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases what do you think the Assadists at the airbases do when they see those drones? Especially if those rebel drones are followed by rebel MLR attacks? The Assadists hide underground. When the Assadists hide underground during rebel ‘drone swarm’ attack or MLR attack do you think those Assadists will be willing to send troops to depots near the front-line? No.
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So why not launch both those ‘drone swarm’ attacks and MLR attacks on regime airbases on the same day as rebel groups launch motorcycle raids on regime depots round that regime airbase whilst the regime is distracted by those ‘drone swarms’?
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You say number 5 is stupid? Let me do the maths for you – How much 1 rebel drone cost to make? $200. How much does 1 ATGM cost? $5000. If rebels send 100 drones (i.e. ‘drone swarm’) to attack a regime airbase on exactly the same hour as rebel Inghimazi troops attack a regime depot near the regime airbase and capture from the regime 50 ATGMs then guess how much this would benefit? 100 drones = $20,000 cost, 50 ATGMs = $250,000 reward. Now tell me, if you were a businessman and someone told you that for a $20,000 risk you could earn $250,000 are you telling you won’t take that opportunity? An idiot wouldn’t so why not use ‘drone swarms’ to help you in your raids to get you more ATGMs?
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6) Everything I said (from number 1/2/3/4/5) means nothing if rebels are not willing to send drones to Tartous and to bring Tartous under drone attack range rebels must push as far west to the Syrian coast as much as possible.
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Why Tartous? Tartous is where Assad regime refines it’s oil for it’s cars/tanks and it’s also where ALL Russian jets go to first when arriving to Syria and where those Russian jets leave from when they return to Russia. This is why rebels must concentrate moving past Tremseh so they can send ‘drone swarm’ attacks on Tartous just like they are doing with Hama airbase right now. Bring Tartous under ‘drone swarm’ strike range and not only do rebels get a chance at destroying the regime’s oil terminus in Tartous (so no oil for Assad’s tanks and no money from oil sales) but it also allows rebels to have a crack at the Russian ship Admiral Kutznov (that smokey aircraft carrier?) when it visits Syria again.
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Then once rebels are able to send ‘drone swarms’ on Tartous (because they pushed considerably past Tremseh?) bring Tartous under the MLR range of rebels rocket attack and surround those MLRs with ATGM operators and mortar teams so if the Assadist get stupid by trying to send infantry towards those MLRs the ATGMs/mortar teams around those MLRs can pick off those Assadists infantry one by one.
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These are 6 simple mistakes rebels need to learn from and which they can correct very easily. If rebels learn these 6 lessons then rebels can make even more Assadists run from their airbases and capture even more left behind regime supplies.
First thing they should be doing with drones is bomb regime soldiers and thier convoys pick ups amd technicals rather than wasting th3m trying to bomb air bases with no success…such a thing a would have a huge demoralizing effect on the regime soldiers and they might get lucky and kill high ranking officers…IS in dier e zor just killed the leading russian officer by using mortars and shells after using drones to check thier locations..trying to bomb air bases is a waste…