Syria Daily, Nov 29: US Solution for Conflict — Biometric Checks on “Moderate” Insurgents


LATEST: Turkish Government Denies Islamic State Launched Attack on Kobane From Its Territory

US officials have explained to The Washington Post how they will resolve Syria’s 44-month conflict through their program to train and equip 5,000 insurgents over the next year.

The sources said prospective fighters will have psychological evaluations, biometrics checks, and stress tests”.

An official at the US Central Command reassured, “In the special operations community, we have a pretty long history of vetting and screening surrogate forces that we’ve worked with.”

The new plan goes even farther: “[It]

But the new plan “is unique to Syria, because we’re going to work with folks that we won’t accompany once we employ them,” he said. “So vetting and screening becomes even more important.”

A “senior US defense official” explained, “We’re taking it extremely seriously,” adding that fighters will “also be educated about the laws of armed conflict”.

The officials said that “successful participants would gradually attain access to higher levels of training and weaponry, and fighters found to be wanting [will] be dismissed from the program”.

Turkish Government Denies Islamic State Launched Attack on Kobane From Its Territory

The Turkish Government denied on Saturday that the Islamic State launched an attack on the northern Syrian town of Kobane from its territory.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,’s office said:

It is known that the terrorist group ISIS has been attacking too many places simultaneously in Kobane and also to Mursitpinar border gate since this morning.

One of these attacks was made in the Syrian side of the border by a bomb-laden vehicle.

The allegation that the vehicle in the mentioned attack reached the border gate through Turkish land is definitely a lie.

Activists had claimed that the Islamic State attack on the mainly-Kurdish Kobane came from the Turkish side of the border.

The jihadists are attacking the town, which it has besieged for almost three months, “from all sides”, according to a spokesman for Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Union Party.

The Kurdish militia YPG said the attacks were heaviest from the south and east, with the Islamic State bringing in reinforcements from other areas such as Raqqa and Manbij.

The assault began with a suicide bomb in an armored vehicle and two other suicide attacks on the Mürşitpınar border crossing near Kobane at about 5 a.m. local time.

Footage from a Turkish outlet of the fighting:

IŞİD, Kobani’ye Türkiye’den saldırdı: Saldırı… by bestanuce1

Smoke rising above Kobane:

The Islamic State had occupied up to 40% of Kobane earlier this month but Kurdish forces have been counter-attacking, recently pushing the jihadists into the southeast corner of the town and taking surrounding hills.

Video: Funeral in Aleppo for Slain Insurgent

The funeral march in Aleppo for Majid Kerman, a fighter of Jaish al-Mujahideen:

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    “We’re taking it extremely seriously.”

    This from President Red LIne or Old Huff and Puff whose threats and promises no one takes seriously anymore. He’s already been cowed by Putin in the Ukraine, as his failure to provide defensive ATGMS and anti-air demonstrate.


    “It looks like new Regime strategy by claiming victory before launching the offensive, same as Daesh. All news and allegations that #FSA retreated from Khazzanat are wrong, and it’s under al-Ansar Brigades.”

    Actually there’s nothing new about it. Every major regime offensive has started with exactly the same initial claims. It’s classic Goebbels’ stuff.


    Assad’s bombing In Raqaa was supposed to prove we need Assad’s help against ISIS but proved why we don’t need his “contribution.”

    As the NY Times put it: “They (the Sunni majority) see American jets sharing the skies with the Syrians but doing nothing to stop them from indiscriminately bombing rebellious neighborhoods.”

    American pilots carefully avoided kiling civilians then got to watch the Genocide Air Force do the exact opposite. Everryone knows the regime’s goal is to cleanse Sunni neighborhoods by such brutal means. I wouldn’t be surprise if it kills 100 civilians for ever enemy fighter, whether rebel or ISIS. Unless it is the most inefficient and incompetent air force on the planet the Genocide Regime doesn’t hit breadlines, bakeries, schools and marketplaces accidentally .

    See: “Conflicting Policies on Syria and Islamic State Erode U.S. Standing in Mideast


    Oil prices plunged $6 in one day to $71.25 as Saudis blocked any cut in OPEC output. According to a recent chart in the economist, Russia needs about $100 or so a barrel to break even. Iran needs about $140 a day.–finance.html

    Watch markets tumble in both countries. They use arms only to finance arms, mercenaries and proxies o threaten neighbors. Putin also needs it to finance a military modernization plan intended for offensive purposes as demonstrated recently. It also pays for stepped up flights and voyages in a blatant attempt to neighbors, Europe and the USA in crude and blatant attempts to intimidate.

    Why do so? It makes sense only because Obama is president, not Reagan, Eisenhower or Truman. As a kid Obama was probably traumatized by schoolyard bullying. If sent to prison, he’d be wearing makeup and getting swapped around for a pack of cigarettes before his first week.

  2. What Obama Doesn’t Understand About Syria

    The U.S. policy to defeat the Islamic State is doomed to failure. Here’s how to fix it.
    By Noah Bonsey, FP

    (I personally don’t think this piece actually explains “HOW to fix it”, just WHAT needs fixing, but it’s a very clear explanation of the problem):

    The current U.S. strategy to destroy the Islamic State is likely doomed to fail. In fact, it risks doing just the opposite of its intended goal: strengthening the jihadis’ appeal in Syria, Iraq, and far beyond, while leaving the door open for the Islamic State to expand into new areas.

    This is in large part because the United States so far has addressed the problem of the Islamic State in isolation from other aspects of the trans-border conflict in Syria and Iraq. Unless Barack Obama’s administration takes a broader view, it will be unable to respond effectively to the deteriorating situation on the ground.

    The good news is that the White House can still change course — and indeed, President Obama has reportedly requested a review of his administration’s strategy in Syria. In crafting a new way forward, the White House needs to understand three points about the Islamic State and the military landscape in which it operates.

    1. Growth is essential to the Islamic State’s future, and its best opportunities are in Syria.

    Demonstrating momentum is crucial to the jihadi group’s ability to win new recruits and supporters. In an atmosphere of sectarian polarization and amid deepening Sunni anger at the use of indiscriminate violence by the Syrian and Iraqi governments and their allied militias, the Islamic State’s primary asset has been its ability to rattle off a string of impressive victories. Its territorial gains project strength, which contrasts starkly with its Sunni rivals, such as the hapless Sunni political figures in Baghdad and the struggling mainstream armed opposition in Syria. Momentum on the battlefield also provides the Islamic State an alluring brand with which to cloak what is, ultimately, its familiar and unappealing product: single-party authoritarian rule, imposed by brutal force and secret police.

    “Be assured, O Muslims, for your state is good and in the best condition,” Islamic State “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said in his latest audiotape. “Its march will not stop and it will continue to expand, with Allah’s permission.”

    Although its propaganda suggests otherwise, in reality the Islamic State has prioritized expansion and consolidation of power in Sunni Arab areas. Insofar as it attempts to seize ground and resources from government and Kurdish forces, it does so on the fringes of their territory or in isolated areas — such as the northern Syrian city of Kobani — that are especially vulnerable.

    The Islamic State has incentive to pick such low-hanging fruit, but it has more to gain from seizing Sunni Arab areas. Each advance in these areas not only contributes to the group’s perceived momentum, but also comes at the expense of local Sunni competitors. This is crucial, because local forces have by far the best track record of beating back the organization in Sunni Arab areas of Iraq and Syria. Local Sunni tribes and insurgents routed the group — then known as the Islamic State of Iraq — with American help in 2007 and 2008, and rebel groups drove it from the city of Aleppo and much of northwestern Syria in early 2014.

    If the Islamic State is able to sideline such competitors and establish a monopoly on Sunni resistance to hated government and militia forces, it will secure its existence for the foreseeable future. It has already effectively accomplished this in Iraq and now hopes to do so in Syria.

    For the Islamic State, the most valuable target for expansion in Syria and Iraq would appear to be the Syrian countryside north of Aleppo. Mainstream rebel factions control the area but are overstretched as they seek to hold the Islamic State at bay near the town of Marea while simultaneously fighting to prevent the regime from encircling their forces inside Aleppo city, 15 miles to the south. Should the jihadis escalate their attack on Marea in the near future, rebel forces already struggling to slow regime progress in Aleppo will probably be unable to prevent significant Islamic State gains.

    At stake in the northern Aleppo countryside is the strategic border territory in the opposition’s heartland. If the Islamic State seizes the area, it would give it control over a key supply line from Turkey and a foothold from which to expand further west. For mainstream rebel forces, the combined human, logistical, and psychological toll of a loss there would be devastating.

    In this context, the current U.S. approach of giving precedence to the Iraqi battlefield while delaying difficult decisions on Syria is at odds with dynamics on the ground.

    2. The twin crises of the Islamic State and Syrian regime are inextricably linked.

    U.S. officials publicly acknowledge that the Syrian regime’s behavior — indeed its very nature — is a primary factor fueling the jihadis’ rise and that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces continue to kill far more civilians (and rebels) than the Islamic State does. They also recognize that the role of mainstream rebels will be essential in reversing jihadi gains. Yet in practice, U.S. policy is emboldening Damascus and undermining the very rebels it is ostensibly designed to support.

    The U.S.-led coalition’s strikes have enabled the regime to reallocate assets to face mainstream rebels, whose defeat remains the regime’s top priority. Since strikes against the Islamic State began, regime forces have gained ground against mainstream rebels on key fronts in Hama province and in Aleppo city; in the case of the latter, they have done so against the very same rebel groups that are confronting the Islamic State in the nearby northern countryside.

    The targeting in Washington’s air campaign has further blurred the lines between U.S. and regime military strategies. Rather than maintain singular focus on hitting Islamic State targets in eastern Syria, the United States has struck al-Nusra Front, an al Qaeda affiliate whose role in combatting the regime and Islamic State has earned it credibility with the opposition’s base, west of Aleppo. On one occasion, the United States also appears to have hit Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi group that has moderated its political platform substantially in recent months and that is broadly viewed as an authentically Syrian (albeit hard-line) component of the rebellion. Washington’s claims that these strikes targeted members of a secretive “Khorasan” cell planning attacks against the United States or Europe are unconvincing in rebel eyes — not least because Washington never publicly mentioned “Khorasan” until the week preceding the first round of strikes.

    Such attacks strengthen jihadi claims that the U.S. campaign aims to quietly boost Assad while degrading a range of Islamist forces, and thus they are a significant blow to the credibility of those rebels willing to partner with the United States. For a rebel commander seeking to convince his fighters that cooperation with Washington is in the rebellion’s best interest, American strikes that ignore the Assad regime while hitting Ahrar al-Sham are extremely difficult to explain. Even assuming “Khorasan” poses a threat justifying urgent action, Washington should more carefully weigh the immediate losses jihadis suffer in strikes against the recruiting benefit they derive from rising disgust with the U.S. approach among the rebel rank and file.

    Washington also faces a more concrete operational problem: How can it hope to empower moderate rebels in northern Syria if the regime continues to drive them toward the brink of defeat? The portion of the White House’s policy explicitly designed to strengthen these forces — a $500 million program to train and equip 5,000 fighters over the course of one year — will prove too little, too late to enable them to hold their ground against anticipated escalations by the Islamic State, ongoing al-Nusra Front efforts to expand control within rebel areas, and continued regime onslaughts.

    3. For a “freeze” to help, it must be fundamentally different from a “cease-fire.”

    U.N. special envoy Staffan de Mistura is advocating a “fighting freeze” in the pivotal battle between regime and opposition forces in Aleppo. The goal is to relieve the humanitarian disaster in the northern city and allow all groups to focus their resources on combatting the Islamic State.

    De Mistura’s use of the word “freeze” rather than “cease-fire” is important. Cease-fires have been discredited in Syria: The regime has exploited them as a pillar of its strategy, cutting such agreements with rebels to cement a military victory or to withdraw resources in one area in order to shift them to another front. The regime’s significant advantage in firepower has ensured that terms are heavily tilted in its favor — and it has often used egregious violations of international humanitarian law, including sieges and indiscriminate bombardment, to achieve its aims. The cease-fires thus have not led to an overall reduction in the level of violence nationally or in the resolution of legitimate grievances that jihadi groups have proved so adept at exploiting.

    A freeze in Aleppo can save lives and aid efforts to combat the Islamic State, but only if it preserves the mainstream opposition’s fighting capacity. If it cements regime victory there or enables Damascus to redeploy resources against mainstream rebels elsewhere, it will work to the Islamic State’s advantage. Insofar as the regime is able to gain ground from mainstream rebels, whether by force or truce, it is clearing Sunni competitors from the jihadis’ path.

    Yet the regime’s position around Aleppo is so strong, given its progress toward severing the final rebel supply line to the city, that it currently has little incentive to reach any deal that would leave the rebels’ fighting ability intact. Damascus would much prefer to deliver a decisive blow to the mainstream opposition in Aleppo, which would cripple the West’s potential partners and leave only the regime as a supposed bulwark against the jihadis. Rebels recognize this, and given their negative experience with cease-fires elsewhere, even those in favor of a freeze are unlikely to invest political capital in convincing the skeptics in their own ranks unless they see new reason to hope for a fair deal.

    The crux of the American dilemma in Syria is thus clear: Degrading jihadi groups requires empowering mainstream Sunni alternatives, but doing so may prove impossible unless Damascus (or its backers in Tehran) can be convinced or compelled to dramatically shift strategy. For now, the regime treats the Western-, Arab-, and Turkish-backed opposition as the main threat to its dominance in Syria and treats the Islamic State as a secondary concern that the United States is already helping to deal with. Iran has done nothing to suggest that it objects to the regime’s strategy; instead, it is enabling it.

    Damascus and Tehran appear to believe that achieving regime victory is simply a matter of maintaining the conflict’s current trajectory. This view, however, is shortsighted and would yield an unprecedented recruiting bonanza for jihadi groups. If Washington wishes to prevent this — and the unending cycle of conflict that it would perpetuate — it must better balance its Iraq and Syria strategies, refine its airstrike tactics, and find ways to change calculations in Damascus and Tehran.

  3. Is the US still going on with this fairy tale of 5k trained insurgents? For real ? One of the biggest jokes ever heard during this conflict.

  4. in other news IS attacks Kobane from its allies territory (Turkey).

    If turks wonder why the EU wont let them in, they only need to look at their leader, his statements and actions.

  5. In Syria related news, JAN you know the terrorists, have taken over Rastan from the FSA.

    more or less every single rebel holding in Syria now is terrorist held.

    • As i said yesterday. Rebels in the north are close to beeing check mated. That jihadists take over from moderate rebels dont suprise me much at all. Nusra and IS are a far more formidable fighting force than any FSA/SRF/IF unit.

      • You’ve been saying that for months. Assad can’t pull it off unless Obama stands by and allows it but we can take that as a given.
        As others have noted, Assad lacks sufficient force for a long siege, rebels know it and they are good at holding on.

        What no one considers is a key political obstacle any regime siege of rebels in Alleppo supported, enabled and made possible by Do Nothing Obama will face in the new Congress. Rebels know Obama is going to be on the hot seat even without such a siege, and an ongoing one will this administration. Never underestimate Obama’s arrogance in doubling down on stupidity under the worse possible conditions. The fact that he continues to rely on Suzie, Tony, Val, Doug, etc. after so many blunders suggests that Obama will compound his position with a sellout deal removing sanctions on Iran and seeking to preserve a New Iranian Empire that includes Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and, Syria–one made without Senate approval and in defiance of the Constitution. Even Obama’s staunchest defenders will have a hard time defending that,, giving Iran’s past crimes against America going back to the marine barracks, the Embassy attack, a year of hostage holding, proxy attacks in Iraq, etc. HIs role in easing Putin’s way in the Ukraine and encouraging aggression there will also get lots of attention.

        On every news channel for weeks and months respected witnesses at Senate hearings attest to Obama’s incompetence and doubling down stubbornness. Obama will face the unpopularity of Nixon after Watergate and Chamberlain after Munich as even his most blind apologists find defending the guy impossible. Toss in two more issues facing public examination: Obama’s insistance on providing a “safety jersey” for the Genocide Regime and his further collusion in genocide by resisting no fly zones for ages.

        At minimum, the furor will paralyze Obama for two years as if Nixon and LBJ had insisted on sticking around. If Congress moves to impeach, there is no doubt it will pass the house. His chances of surviving in the Senate, especially after bypassing it in an Iran deal, will be small. For the same reason many Republicans turned on Nixon, many Democrats are already turning on Obama whose foreign policy is about to become more unpopular and detested than ever.

    • Isn’t that what Assad hoped to do and thereby successfully persuade Obama, Suzie, Tony, Denis, and Val to do what they were inclined to do in any case–come to his rescue?

      Radicals have been fed on the crimes of all parties above but you exaggerate their position overall. It may apply in the north and they are apparently hoping to do likewise in the south with Obama’s usual blundering ways. Prediction: Assad and allies continue their genocide against Sunnis and will continue his covert support for the regime, imaginging Sunnis won’t notice what is self-evident.
      Obama and crew have done the equivalent of placing a “Don’t Hit This Guy” Jersey on a star offensive player in footfall practice.

      By the time the second term of the Iranian-Putin-Assad Stooge ends, ISIS will have wiped out a good portion of Alawites and moderates could well be eliminated. Obama’s successor will have a do undo the mess this incompetent, Iran-loving bunch in the White House left behind. The betrayal of American security by Obama and crew will be the top election issue by then with Republicans exploiting it and Democrats denouncing Obama as Republicans denounced Nixon.

      No Obama successor will call on Assad for help. Whoever gets the job will turn on the regime within days of being sworn in Meanwhile Obama’s lousy place as an incompetent, Chamberlain-like, genocide supporting, ally betraying figure is sealed in in cement at this point.

      • Above was a reply to Al Bistani’s claim that extremists totally dominate–a line the regime has sought to promote from Day One.


    #1: Jan has blown away a barrier in Zahraa, wiping out many defenders who tend to be mostly NDF and Hezbollah. See for yourself:

    #2: Harasta road is said to have been closed due to the heavy fighting between opposition & regime forces


    Cedric Larousse writes that JAN’s move on Rastan could backfire. FSA is a popular support base there. JAN does not. Most commanders are FSA there as well. Situation will clearly turn to bloodbath because huge number of Rastan city army defectors will refuse Nusra men (from countryside.

    Markito0171 writes that Jabhat al Nusra moved into Ma`arrat Hurmah after “agreement with #FSA.” (Did the FSA have a choice? Obama has always tried to keep it as unarmed as possible when compared to Islamists or to the regime. President No Learn is doing the same to the Ukrainians.


    Obama’s ‘Horrible Bosses 3’ Audition for Secretary of Defense.

    As Mike Doran jokes: “Must serve apprenticeship in office of Ben Rhodes,” who, like Suzy, Tony, Val and Denis, played a major role in creating the present foreign policiy disasters. All retain their privileged places in the White House as his obstinacy shows no sign of learning lessons. Caution: Words mean nothing. Only deeds count.

    The Wall Street Journal describes the current farce in choosing a secretary of defense. An account entitled Obama: ‘Horrible Bosses 3’ Audition” begins by noting what we’ve seen repeatedly: “The president’s playbook when things go wrong: Deny knowledge, blame hapless subordinates.”

    It’s another way in which The Great Excuse Maker and Double Down on Mistakes Guy contrasts with Harry Truman, famos for “The Buck Stops Here” sign on his desk and his firm opposition to Joseph Stalin’s bullying attempts. We are so fortunate Obama and his advisors weren’t in charge in 1946 or they’d have given away Greece, Turkey and Iran to Stalin in the hopes that he’d show gratitude by acting nice.

    WSJ also has an article on the geostrategic benefits of fracking. See:

    The New Oil Order

    OPEC feels the squeeze from the U.S. shale boom.


    In the nearby desert area, ISIS has reached positions only 14 kilomenters from from Khalkhalah Airbase–Tazi Morocco.;365973472;330771585;0;0;1496886;261751

    Obviously taking the vase would be a major victory for ISIS. Consequences, especially for the regime, would be far worse than the mere loss of aircraft and supplies, the slaughter of survivors and the subsequent morale effect the execution videos would have on troops and loyalists elsewhere.

    Zoom back on the map. See the Al Lajat wasteland to the west. Note how rebels have cut almost all roads to Sweida Province further West. Note how the only main road south to Sweida Province in the east would fall into the hands of ISIS if the base falls.

    Suweida Province would be totally cut off from the regime by land. The ISIS threat to Sweida Province could force a Druze rebel alliance and push Obama to increase backing for rebels in the south, adding pressure for a NFZ zone there. ISIS would also threaten both the regime and rebels to the north.


    Assuming ISIS intends to such an attack and has assembled the required forces, it is a brilliant strategic mood. Who can stop ISIS at taking the base in that case?

    NOT THE REGIME I think. The base is probably likely defended by mix of unwilling Sunni conscripts and Shabihha minders. The same is likely true of two army bases further north. Its possible he can scrape up troops in the south, creating new vulnerabilities but would they be willing, could they get there in time and would they suffice?

    NOT THE REBELS. In the West they are too far away and would expose themselves to risk in the rear. In East Ghouta, rebel forces are too distant and who are too far away in the West and too distant with those regime army bases in between. So long as the Genocide Regime remains their main and most hated enemies they benefit if ISIS cut off regime access in a place where they cannot at present.

    OBAMA? His Hesitancy’s history is legendary. If he intervenes at all it would be a the last minute. Intervention to save the Genocide regime would alienate rebels further and be politically unpopular back home. Air power alone might not suffice. This is not Kobane.


    That would be unstoppable–a Dream Team–but once again the main thing preventing it is the presence of war criminals in power. If those with blood on their hands were arrested, removed and replaced, a deal might be possible. Otherwise, the rebels have no incentive to save Assad and risk being backstabbed at the same time near Nawa and elsewhere by Obama as soon as they’ve served his purposes.

    • “The ISIS threat to Sweida Province could force a Druze rebel alliance …”

      Or force them to side with the regime since ISIS views them as apostates.

      • Read it again. I said a Druze rebel alliance (against both ISIS and the regime) NOT a Druze-ISIS alliance unless you were supporting regime propaganda. Why would the Druze ally with ISIS? Allying with rebels would make sense since they can do a better job fighting ISIS and while the regime has been repeatedly beaten by ISIS unlike the rebels.


    I hoped rebels woujld take the airbase and cut off Sweida but that would have taken time. Now it seems ISIS could beat them to the punch.

    Most folks saw ISIS recent move east of Damascus as intended to threaten rebels in East Ghouta by sandwiching them against Assad forces and they could be right. However the problem with that is that it would take time and Obama would have less excuse not to intervene. Going after Khalkhalah and cutting off Sweida offers the prospect of more immediate goodies and easier pickings, lots of them.


    THE SITUATION: here are (unconfirmed) reports that #IS forces seized control of the Murshidpinar border crossing , cutting off Kobane after 3 car bomb attacks. ISIS has captured large parts of Kobane. Countless sources say ISIS has ambushed YPG from Turkish territoryand th grain silos on the other side of the border. Elsewhere, JAN is moving on the FSA in its heartland.


    Doing so would allow three things unlikely for a long time to come otherwise:

    1. Turkish intervention in the north–a Tide Changer.
    2. Going to war on Assad Makes Attacks on JAN politically possible (At present they are rightly seen as “supporting the greater enemy: the Genocide Regime).
    3. It could quickly enable a Druze-Alawite-Rebel-Obama alliance which ISIS would have no chance of defeating near Khalkhalah–another Tide Changer. At present an ISIS victory seems certain there if it intends a serious attack.

    Why hesitate? Why ponder? It makes no sense. However Obama and crew are notorius for making promises and then missing the train. The Wrecking Crew continues to sacrifice our security and that of our allies by giveaways to the Supreme Leader who returns every favor by pissing on their heads. In the Ukraine, Putin is about to drop a new load on Obama’s face as a mesmerized president fails to make the necessary evasive moves.

    SALIMEYEH (EAST OF HAMA) Another Place You Need to Watch as Obama’s obstinacy continues to Make Alliance Impossible

    Clashes between Assad-forces & IslamicState at outskirts of Barri ash Sharqi 12km east of Salamiyah–Markito0171.


    #1: Tank battle threatens regime’s main barrier to Nubbol, above Zahraa. Regime has been parachuting supplies into both genocide-supporting suburbs. Source: Markito0171

    #2: Nusra VBIED attack on the “Joud” regime military camp in #Zahra.–Paradoxy.

    #3: Heavy clashes going in Jam’iyat al-Jud in #Zahraa town, and Rebels took control of some buildings in the area.–archicivilians.


    Assad forces are fortifying the grain silos in Ezra (Israa) in expectation of a rebel attack. A rebel victory there combined with an ISIS one on the eastern side of the Lajat wasteland would cost the regime the entire south.


    The opposition captured around 40 regime forces + several sleeper cells in Zibdin, E. Ghouta 2 night ago, Genocide Regime sought to infilitrate the rebel rear. Additionally opposition repelled another regime attack on Zibdin in E. Ghouta y’day killing close to 20 regime forces reportedly.–Source: Paradoxy.


    Has the Siyasiyeh bridge been rebuilt? The Genocide Air Force is bomging it today and shelling ISIS forces on Saqer Island.


    Lots of reports in Persian-language press today of knife attacks yesterday in Jahrom on six young women, five of whom are students.


      Funeral of Iranian commander Hasan Hizbawy, who was killed in #Daraa will be held tomorrow in Ahvaz, Iran


      Johnny SIx tweets: “37 Regime forces killed in Rebel advance in Handarat.”

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