Displaced women sit in a field near a camp in northwest Idlib Province, May 8, 2019
Amid a Russian-regime offensive and attacks on civilians across northwest Syria, a Turkish official warns that the country can take no more refugees.
Abdullah Ayaz of the Interior Ministry said of the assault in Idlib and northern Hama Provinces, shattering a demilitarized zone declared by Russia and Turkey last September:
As Turkey, I would like to state that we do not have any more space left for a new migration wave. It is important that a political solution is found for conflicts in Idlib and a political transition is ensured there.
If the long-term solutions about migration are not put on the table; if enough effort is not put for these [solutions] to be realized; all parties, countries, and the international community will have to handle this issue with the approach that it is outside their borders.
Turkey hosts more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees, but blocked entries from 2016.
Last week Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued his harshest condemnation of Russia-regime attacks on civilians and the May 6 offensive, including Assad regime attacks on Turkish observation posts: “We want deaths to stop in Syria, the bombing of Idlib with barrel and phosphorus bombs is inexcusable.”
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu called out to Moscow, “Russia needs to fulfill its responsibility here.”
But the Assad regime has persisted with its bombing and shelling, killing at least 21 civilians on Thursday, and Russia has remained silent about the attacks.
See Syria Daily, June 21: Russians Visit Assad — But No Word on Stalled Northwest Offensive
Meanwhile, the regime has launched a new wave in the offensive, which has stalled since gains in its first week, but has suffered heavy casualties in northwest Hama.
Rebel sources claimed more than 100 regime troops were killed as they tried again to take the key hilltop town of Tal Maleh, which overlooks a road linking regime positions.
Since late April, about 375 civilians have been killed by Russian and regime bombardment. An estimated 330,000 have fled their homes, with almost 30 medical centers damaged or destroyed
An estimated 3 million people — about 20% of Syria’s remaining population — live in northern Hama and Idlib Provinces.
Regime Calls Off Attempt to Take Key Town
The regime has acknowledged failure to take the key hilltop town of Kabani, in northeast Latakia Province, after 45 days of attacks.
The Al Masdar blog, a channel for regime military sources, said the 4th Armored Division has left Kabani for northwestern Hama.
The Syrian Army and National Defense Forces militias suffered heavy losses in the assault.
The capture of Kabani would have opened up Idlib and northwest Hama Provinces to regime advances. Instead, the 4th Armored — including most of its elite 42nd Brigade — is being redeployed to the Kafr Naboudeh front to hold back a rebel counter-offensive.
Supported by Russian airstrikes and ground advisors, the regime took Kafr Naboudeh in the first days of the May 6 offensive but has been under pressure since rebels counter-attacked three weeks ago.
To return back to this tweet: “another Rebel weaponized drone dropped few days ago on N. #Latakia front.” – @QalaatAlMudiq
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As I said before here’s the 6 chief flaws I see with rebel’s drone use strategy:
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1) They are not using them in large enough numbers (i.e. they using 10 or 30 rather using 50 or 80 in one go) on the same hour. Why is this important? The fewer the drone rebels use on a single target the more easier it becomes for the regime/Russians to shoot them all down, BUT use 100 weaponised drones in one go (i.e. within a single hour) & the regime/russians won’t be able to shoot them all down.
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2) Those drones aren’t being combined with MLR attacks so combine those ‘drone swarms’ with MLRs & attack regime airbases using both drones & MLRs. Why? Because the anti-aircraft weaponry the regime/russians airbases use to shoot down a drone or stop MLRs can only concentrate upon one type of attack at a time (i.e. it can either only focus on the weaponised drone swarms or on MLRs but it can’t concentrate on both drones & MLRs AT THE SAME TIME) do both in either the ‘drone swarms’ will do alot of damage (because regime/russia too busy with the MLRs?) or the MLRs will do the most damage (because regime/russia airbase troops too busy with the MLRs?).
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3) The attacks of drone swarms aren’t being used to attack a regime airbase from multiple axis (i.e. from north & south or west & east) like rebels do with a tank attack. Why? If rebels launch a drone swarm attack from the west the regime anti-air base & soldiers can just move to the east of that airbase and hide their until the ‘drone swarms’ stop attacking, if rebels want to catch out as many regime troops as possible then have the rebels use their ‘drone swarms’ to attack regime airbase from multiple axis (i.e. from north & south or west & east) during such ‘drone swarm’ attacks that way rebels LEAVE NO HIDING SPACE DURING DRONE SWARM ATTACK and all the Assadists will get caught out.
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4) Why aren’t rebel ATGM teams following-up a hit on those regime airbases after rebel ‘drone swarm’ attacks? When rebels launch a ‘drone swarm’ attack on a regime airbase do rebels not realise that regime rushes their soldiers either out of such airbases after a ‘drone swarm’ attack and return those soldiers back again? So why isn’t there a ATGM team ready to pick-off/STRIKE with ATGM those regime soldiers when they run away from their airbase after a rebel ‘drone swarm’ attack?
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5) Why aren’t rebels combining their ‘drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases with ‘behind enemy line’ motorcycle/vehicle raids on regime depots?
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What do I mean? When rebels are sending their drone swarm’ attacks on regime airbases what do you think the Assadists at the airbases do when they see those drones? Especially if those rebel drones are followed by rebel MLR attacks? The Assadists hide underground. When the Assadists hide underground during rebel ‘drone swarm’ attack or MLR attack do you think those Assadists will be willing to send troops to depots near the front-line? No.
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So why not launch both those ‘drone swarm’ attacks and MLR attacks on regime airbases on the same day as rebel groups launch motorcycle raids on regime depots round that regime airbase whilst the regime is distracted by those ‘drone swarms’?
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You say number 5 is stupid? Let me do the maths for you – How much 1 rebel drone cost to make? $200. How much does 1 ATGM cost? $5000. If rebels send 100 drones (i.e. ‘drone swarm’) to attack a regime airbase on exactly the same hour as rebel Inghimazi troops attack a regime depot near the regime airbase and capture from the regime 50 ATGMs then guess how much this would benefit? 100 drones = $20,000 cost, 50 ATGMs = $250,000 reward. Now tell me, if you were a businessman and someone told you that for a $20,000 risk you could earn $250,000 are you telling you won’t take that opportunity? An idiot wouldn’t so why not use ‘drone swarms’ to help you in your raids to get you more ATGMs?
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6) Everything I said (from number 1/2/3/4/5) means nothing if rebels are not willing to send drones to Tartous and to bring Tartous under drone attack range rebels must push as far west to the Syrian coast as much as possible.
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Why Tartous? Tartous is where Assad regime refines it’s oil for it’s cars/tanks and it’s also where ALL Russian jets go to first when arriving to Syria and where those Russian jets leave from when they return to Russia. This is why rebels must concentrate moving past Tremseh so they can send ‘drone swarm’ attacks on Tartous just like they are doing with Hama airbase right now.
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These are 6 simple mistakes rebels need to learn from and which they can correct very easily. If rebels learn these 6 lessons then rebels can make even more Assadists run from their airbases and capture even more left behind regime supplies.