Bodies of victims in a building after a chlorine attack, Douma, Syria, April 7, 2018
The Assad regime is trying to block further investigation of a deadly chlorine attack near Syria’s capital Damascus in April 2018, preventing any attribution of blame.
Residents and rescue workers said 43 people were killed when a cylinder dropped by a regime helicopter struck a building in Douma in the East Ghouta area and lodged in a roof balcony.
Other regime chlorine attacks since 2014 have not been as lethal, but on this occasion the toxic gas funneled down the building, suffocating people who were moving up from a basement where they had been hiding.
The assault helped force a surrender the next day in Douma, the last remaining opposition area in East Ghouta, after a two-month Russian-regime offensive that killed and wounded thousands of civilians and years of siege.
On March 1, 2019, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concluded that there were “reasonable grounds” that chlorine had been released. Inspectors effectively found that a regime helicopter carried out the assault, but did not have a mandate to assign blame.
The OPCW is now seeking to send an Investigations and Identification Team to Douma for studies that would consider responsibility. The head is Santiago Oñate Laborde, a lawyer who was Mexico’s representative at the OPCW and a legal adviser to the organization.
Blocking the Investigation
But the regime is refusing to issue a visa to the head of the IIT. Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad has written the OPCW announcing that the regime does not recognize the investigating team.
The OPCW has written back, asking the regime to reconsider and offering to hold discussions in The Hague in the Netherlands instead of Damascus.
Russia and the regime have waged a campaign since autumn 2017 to undermine the OPCW, after it concluded that the Assad regime was responsible for a nerve agent attack in April 2017 that killed about 90 people and wounded hundreds in the town of Khan Sheikhoun in northwest Syria.
Moscow vetoed the extension of the mandate for the OPCW’s Joint Investigative Mechanism, established in 2015 with the authority to assign blame.
But in June 2018, a special session of OPCW state members overrode Russian, Iranian, and regime objections and voted by a large majority that “whenever a chemical weapons use occurs on the territory of a state party, those who were the perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved should be identified”.
Russia continued its effort to prevent the establishment of the team, but it is now almost ready to begin work.
Stepping Up Propaganda
Facing the prospect of the IIT, Russia has escalated the propaganda campaign against the OPCW. Two weeks ago, Moscow presented a draft resolution to the UN Security Council accusing the inspectors of politicization. A diplomat noted, “What it’s really about of course is the Russians trying to strangle OPCW.”
Days before the introduction of the resolution, an unknown source fed a document to a UK-based, pro-regime “Working Group”, hoping to undermine the OPCW’s final report on the Douma attack.
The assessment by Ian Henderson, a consultant and former OPCW staffer, claimed the likelihood that the chlorine canister — and a second that broke through the roof of another building but failed to realize its chemicals — was placed by opposition groups, rather than dropped by the regime helicopter.
The claim has been widely pushed by Russian State outlets and by pro-Assad activists, despite questions about Henderson’s computer model and findings and whether any other expert supported the assessment.
An OPCW official said three teams of experts from three countries produced the conclusions that led to the organization’s final report. He/she said that Henderson’s document can be submitted to the IIT for consideration.
“1. There is no evidence that anyone apart from Henderson supported the assessment.”
The work in analysing the physical data would never have been left to just one man.
2. There is no indication of what an “FFM engineering sub-team” is apart from Henderson, as a consultant, and — according to the Working Group that circulated the document — researchers at “two European universities”.
“FFM engineering sub-team” is clearly stated on the document which the OPCW does not deny is genuine.It refers to those experts who were tasked with explaining the origin of the canisters (as stated in the preliminary report released last year).
“3. Again, the document was not “suppressed”. That’s a misrepresentation by pro-Assad activists.”
It was completely left out of the final report – deliberately. We know it was suppressed because it was leaked by OPCW members angered that their research was ignored for political expediency.
“4. Yes, the document does dispute if a chlorine attack took place with its assertion that the cylinders were placed and not dropped from aircraft. The Working Group takes this to mean that there was no release of chlorine, but a “staged massacre” of victims.”
No. Any chlorine could have been released by those who placed the canisters in the locations they were found. Moreover, the final OPCW report never claims that anyone actually died from chlorine poisoning since none of the biomedical samples (including hair, blood and urine) indicate this. Only some of the environmental samples showed POSSIBLE exposure to chlorine gas.
“5. The Working Group is lying that it was contacted by “OPCW members”. Its sole source was one (unnamed) person who provided the Henderson assessment by e-mail.”
The document was obviously leaked by OPCW members or it would never have come to the attention of the Working Group.
“6. Postol did not “independently confirm” findings as he does not have the data and computer model to do so.”
He is releasing his analysis next week. And, yes, he does have the means to confirm it.
1. You confuse someone working on Henderson’s “sub-team” with someone — anyone — supporting his claims in the memorandum.
2. No, the OPCW has never confirmed an “engineering sub-team”, only that Henderson was used as a consultant.
3. Henderson’s assessment was left out because it was an outlier that was not supported by any other OPCW expert working on Douma.
If you knew anything about how Governments, NGOs, and corporate entities carry out analysis, you would understand this is not “suppression” but a dissenting opinion that did not make the final report.
4. Russia is disputing chlorine release. Biomedical and enviromental support finding of chlorine — even though conclusive link between victims and chlorine canister not possible because of bodies being buried before Russia and regime forces took control of Area.
5. No, the document could have been leaked by someone who received the document who was not OPCW staff, e.g., a member of an OPCW delegation.
6. Yeah, tell me more about Postol’s aptitude in chemistry — and indeed in munitions and engineering after the East Ghouta and Khan Sheikhoun episodes.
Ted Postol confirms the scientific credibility of the leaked (and suppressed) OPCW document indicating that the Douma attack was staged: https://larouchepub.com/pr/2019/190522_opcw_report.html
The suppressed document suggests that the two canisters were placed in the locations they were found and were not dropped from an aircraft (page 8, paragraphs 32-33): https://off-guardian.org/wp-content/medialibrary/Engineering-assessment-of-two-cylinders-observed-at-the-Douma-incident-27-February-2019-1.pdf
CORRECTION: 1) Postol didn’t confirm — he offered an opinion, as he has on previous Assad regime sarin and chlorine attacks; 2) The “OPCW document” is an assessment from a dissenting consultant — the OPCW final report points to chlorine attack on Douma in April 2018; 3) the Henderson assessment was not suppressed — it was considered but findings from experts in three countries formed basis of OPCW report.
Thanks for writing.
The report is signed by Ian Henderson, but the research was conducted by the “FFM’s engineering sub-team” which he directed. People like you have been trying to portray Henderson as some crank or lone voice of dissent but the analysis was done not just by himself but with the collaboration of others. The suppressed document never disputes whether a chlorine attack too place. It merely comments on the physics of the material evidence examined and concludes that the canisters were placed in their locations and not dropped from any aircraft, indicating the attack was staged by rebels.
The Working Group added that OPCW members, which may not have been Henderson himself, contacted them to leak the document that was suppressed by the OPCW: http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/assessment-by-the-engineering-sub-team-of-the-opcw-fact-finding-mission-investigating-the-alleged-chemical-attack-in-douma-in-april-2018
“We thank the OPCW staff members who have communicated with us at considerable personal risk. We undertake to protect the identities of any sources who communicate with us.”
And, yes, Postol did independently confirm the findings and will be making his own assessment shortly.
1. There is no evidence that anyone apart from Henderson supported the assessment.
2. There is no indication of what an “FFM engineering sub-team” is apart from Henderson, as a consultant, and — according to the Working Group that circulated the document — researchers at “two European universities”.
3. Again, the document was not “suppressed”. That’s a misrepresentation by pro-Assad activists.
4. Yes, the document does dispute if a chlorine attack took place with its assertion that the cylinders were placed and not dropped from aircraft. The Working Group takes this to mean that there was no release of chlorine, but a “staged massacre” of victims.
5. The Working Group is lying that it was contacted by “OPCW members”. Its sole source was one (unnamed) person who provided the Henderson assessment by e-mail.
6. Postol did not “independently confirm” findings as he does not have the data and computer model to do so.