A woman cries while sitting on the rubble of her house, destroyed in an Israeli strike on the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, March 18, 2025 (Eyad Baba/AFP/Getty)

Jonathan Este of The Conversation initially asked me to consider his questions about the effect of the Trump Administration’s bombing of the Houthi movement in Yemen.

As I drafted the answers, news broke of the renewal of Israel’s “open-ended” war on Gaza, slaying more than 400 people early Tuesday. So we expanded the Q&A to consider the expansion of killing across the region.

Do the Israeli airstrikes on Gaza mean the ceasefire deal is officially dead?

Yes. This is the end of the two-month ceasefire that paused Israel’s open-ended war on Gaza. The six-week Phase 1 of the ceasefire officially ended on March 1, after some hostages held by Hamas were exchanged for some Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons.

There never was a possibility of a Phase 2. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, facing pressure from hard-right groups inside and close to his government and still vowing to destroy Hamas, was not going to accept a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Hamas remaining in the Strip. Hamas was never going to accept eviction – and there was no prospect of agreement on a successor Palestinian government for Gaza.

See also Q&A: Why There Will Be No Phase 2 in Israel-Gaza Ceasefire

So Netanyahu, also being pressed by families of the remaining 59 hostages, sought an extension of phase one with the return of all those dead or alive. Hamas, whose last leverage is retaining those hostages, demanded a Phase 2.

Israel cut off humanitarian assistance earlier this month. Returning to the aerial assault was the next step. The renewal of ground attacks will be next.

What is Israel’s long-term plan for Gaza?

There is no long-term plan at the moment. Netanyahu needs a short-term return of the hostages to escape his political bind, not to mention his ongoing bribery trial.

Israel’s hard right – and Donald Trump – may envisage a depopulated Gaza under Israeli military rule. But all such ambitions will be suspended as the death and destruction continues.

What has been overshadowed is the possibility of a long-term plan in the West Bank, where Israel has been stepping up military operations and violence is escalating. As the world watches Gaza, the Israelis may seek to expand and consolidate their de facto rule through settlements in a programme which will be tantamount to annexation.

Donald Trump saw the Gaza ceasefire as his deal. How will he react to Netanyahu breaking it?

Trump was happy to grab the immediate, self-proclaimed glory of “peacemaker” for Phase 1.

Since there was no possibility of being a peacemaker for a Phase 2, Trump set this aside for the fantasy of a Trump Tower and his golden statue on the “Riviera of the Middle East”.

Now he will be content to blame and bash Hamas.

Meanwhile the US has been attacking the Houthis in Yemen. What is Trump’s strategy here?

The airstrikes are, in part at least, Trump speaking to the American public. He poses as a “peacemaker” at times, but he enjoys playing the tough guy. And, at a time when economic issues and Musk-inflicted chaos may dent his approval rating, he could rally support with the bombing.

At the same time, Trump has carried out his standard ploy with Iran’s leaders: give me a photo opportunity for the “art of the deal” or I’ll “rain hell on you”.

A direct strike on Tehran would unleash repercussions throughout the Middle East. Even though Iran has been weakened in the past year, it still has the capability to strike Americans in the region.

So the low-cost option is to fire on Iran’s ally in Yemen. Some officials in the Trump Administration will favor this as a way of putting pressure on the Iranians ahead of any potential talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme. Others will see this as part of backing for Israel amid the open-ended war in Gaza, and still others could endorse the step as a bolstering of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. And there is always the argument that the strikes could deter Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.

The Iranian response has been fairly muted. Why is that?

Iran’s leadership is embroiled in a combination of economic, social and regional problems, perhaps the most serious situation since the mass protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election.

Tehran’s projection of power has been shaken by the fall of its ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon last year, and an eroding position in Iraq, where Iran’s influence over the government of prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is looking increasingly tenuous.

The economy is in a parlous state. In early 2018, the exchange rate was 45,000 Iranian rial to the dollar. Now it is approaching 1 million to the dollar.

Inflation is officially at 36%, but is far higher in reality, particularly for food and other essentials. Unemployment is rising and infrastructure is crumbling. There are shortages of electricity in a country that is the world’s seventh-largest oil producer.

Having faced the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests since September 2022, the regime is caught between making accommodations to public discontent and cracking down on rights. Some political prisoners have been released, but authorities are pursuing a draconian campaign against women who dare not to wear the hijab.

Hardliners are trying to curb the centrist government, forcing out the economy minister, Abdolnaser Hemmati, and the foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was central in the 2015 agreement that restricted Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Pursuing both that domestic campaign and confrontation abroad is a tall order.

What does this mean for a new nuclear deal with Iran?

Some Trump advisors may believe they can use the sledgehammer in Yemen to bludgeon Iran to the negotiating table and Trump’s photo opportunity with the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, or Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

Good luck with that. Iran may be weakened, but Khamenei is not going to negotiate at the point of an American weapon. Responding to news of a Trump letter to Tehran that threatened, “There are two ways Iran can be handled: militarily, or you make a deal,” last week Khamenei dismissed the idea of talking with the Trump administration.

He said: “When we know they won’t honor it, what’s the point of negotiating? Therefore, the invitation to negotiate … is a deception of public opinion.”

Recent history is instructive. In 2013, Khamenei finally relented to nuclear deal talks when told by the then president, Hassan Rouhani, of an imminent economic collapse if Iran held out. More than five years later, however, the Iranian leadership was prepared to withstand Trump’s “maximum pressure” and withdrawal from the nuclear agreement.

Iran’s idea for talks was based on a cautious process beginning with confidence-building measures on both sides. But a US approach predicated on bombing and bluster has effectively sidelined that.

How does this play in terms of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States?

The Gulf States will be watching carefully. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are happy for the containment of Iran’s power, and both are also engaged — as in Trump 1.0 — in flattering the reality TV star’s ego.

But the Houthis have fired missiles on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including on oil installations, in 2018 and 2021-2022. The two kingdoms will want to avoid any return to that prospect.

Thus, the reaction from Riyadh and the Emirates so far has been silence. If the Trump Administration continues, let alone escalates, attacks, that reticence may be hard to sustain.

What would Donald Trump consider a “success” in his dealings with Iran?

A photo with the Supreme Leader. Seriously.

Think back to 2019. Trump dropped his “Little Rocket Man” and “Fire and Fury” taunts when North Korea’s Kim Jong-un sent him a giant envelope with a giant invitation to visit Pyongyang.

Nothing of substance came out of the US-North Korean talks. Indeed, critics said the Trump Administration made concessions that hindered the security of South Korea, as its leader said he might cut assistance to Seoul.

But Trump had his pictures, and North Korea is not on his agenda in 2025.

The question is what will happen when — not if — Trump is rejected in his quest for a photo op in the Islamic Republic.

Would he settle for images of Tehran burning instead?

Given the personal agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel’s resumption of its open-ended war on Gaza, that is not beyond the realm of possibility.

The Conversation