A march for Kurdish self-determination in northeast Syria (Delil Soulieiman/AFP/Getty)
Co-published with The Conversation:
In northeast Syria, the 12 1/2-year conflict is far from over.
Russian fighter jets buzz US surveillance drones, threatening to bring them down. Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets on American positions.
The Assad regime maintains that it will “regain every inch” of Syria, ending Kurdish autonomy in the northeast. Turkey — considering the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK — carries out periodic strikes, following its seizure of part of the border area in October 2019.
And the Islamic State, expelled from its last village is March 2019, is still present. Its cells attack civilians and the Assad regime’s military buses, killing at least 23 troops on August 11.
In a multi-sided confrontation where — amid the regime’s deadly repression — no one has “won”, the headline is of a possible Russian-Iranian-US showdown. But that is a diversion from a local story where Syria’s Kurds could be the biggest losers in the northeast.
Russia Harasses the US
On July 16, a Russian Su-35 fighter jet flew close to a US MC-12 turboprop surveillance aircraft, flying in support of operations against Islamic State cells.
American officials said the MC-12’s four crew members were endangered, and added that Russian harassment had complicated strike against an ISIS leader earlier in July.
Moscow disregarded the message. On July 23, another Russian fighter jet damaged a US MQ-9 Reaper drone, surveilling northern Syria, when it flew within a few meters of the UAV and fired flares.
One flare struck the Reaper’s propeller. A drone operator kept the UAV in the air and guided it back to its home base.
Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, the commander of the 9th Air Force, issued a statement: “We call upon the Russian forces in Syria to put an immediate end to this reckless, unprovoked, and unprofessional behavior.”
Some analysts seized on the incidents to declare an imminent confrontation. Citing movements of Iranian-backed militia and Assad regime troops and materiel as well as the Russian harassment, the the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War declared, “Iran, Russia, and the Syrian Regime Are Coordinating to Expel US Forces From Syria”.
Despite a de facto “deconfliction” arrangement with US forces, Russia has discussed operations with Iran to prop up the Assad regime throughout the Syrian conflict. In summer 2015, Iran’s leading general, Qassem Soleimani, went to Moscow for consultations on the massive Russian military intervention that September.
Air and ground forces have been supported by a disinformation campaign which — with the support of pro-Kremlin and pro-Assad activists in the West — has declared for years that US forces are “stealing” oil and grain from the Kurdish-controlled northeast.
But ISW’s assessment is hyperbolic. The Chair of the US Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, told a press briefing on July 18 that additional military deployments were not needed to fend off Russian harassment.
“There’s been an uptick, but I wouldn’t overstate it too much,” Milley said. “We’ve got adequate capabilities to defend ourselves.”
Equally important, assessments such as ISW’s demote, or even erase, the local as they focus on foreign powers. Specifically, the attention to a US-Russian-Iranian confrontation ignores the group at greatest risk in any showdown: Syria’s Kurdish population.
A People Without A Home
In 2015, the prospect was of an Islamic State caliphate across northern Syria. ISIS controlled about one-third of the country, with the prospect of further gains.
But the Kurds, backed by US military assistance, held out. They repelled ISIS’s four-month siege of Kobane in January 2015, at the cost of thousands of lives, and then began the fightback to reclaim territory. Raqqa, Syria’s 7th-largest city and the center of the Caliphate, was liberated in October 2017. The following September, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council declared the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.
But autonomy would inevitably be tenuous for a Kurdish population — estimated at between 30 and 45 million — who have struggled for decades for a state in Syria, Iran, Iraq, or Turkey.
The Assad regime, which suppressed Kurdish protests in 2004-2005, was anxious to regain authority that it had lost in the months after nationwide demonstrations began in March 2011. Tehran’s’s regime not only chafed at US-supported Kurdish forces but also had its own problematic relations with Iranian Kurds in the northwest of the country. And Turkey’s Erdoğan Government, because of its internal fight with the PKK, was dedicated to breaking the Kurdish cantons.
Ankara came close to doing so. Having already overrun the Afrin canton in northwest Syria in 2018, Erdoğan sought an opening to advance in the north and northeast. He got it from Donald Trump, who offered in phone calls in December 2018 and October 2019 to withdraw all US troops. The Pentagon checked Trump on the first occasion, but Erdoğan seized on the second “green light” to launch a cross-border invasion seizing a strip along the border.
Do “The Kurds Always Lose in the End”?
In April 2013, at an international gathering in Oxford in the UK, a US military officer told me, “I can’t see us maintaining a presence. The Kurds always lose in the end.”
More than a decade later, about 900 US troops remain in Syria, many of them working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But Erdoğan is still watching, waiting, and making recurrent statements that the Kurds must capitulate. Bashar al-Assad is still insisting that he should be the leader of the northeast. As Iran fences with the US over sanctions and Tehran’s nuclear program, the Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets. And Russia — entangled in Vladimir Putin’s losing gamble in Ukraine — is pursuing Syrian “pinpricks” against the Americans, hoping that Washington will finally abandon the Kurds.
On August 4, as political and military analysts were watching Russia and the US, there was another statement from northeast Syria. A day earlier, a Turkish drone strike on a car killed four members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and wounded two.
The Kurdish-led AANES called on the US to take a public position over the Turkish attacks, which have killed dozens of Syrian Kurdish fighters this year. Washington must “have a clear stance…regarding the targeting of our people and fighters”, it said.
There was no immediate reaction from either the American military or the Biden Administration.
[Editor’s Note: Another example of self-praise by the Iranian regime in one of its State outlets….]
Former envoy lauds foreign policy of Raisi administration: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/487572/Former-envoy-lauds-foreign-policy-of-Raisi-administration
“Mohsen Pakaeen, the former Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, has hailed the achievements of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus in the Raisi administration, saying it has been organized, smart and in line with the maximum interests and national security of the Iranian people.He also said that Iranian president knows well how to solve bilateral issues with certain countries.”
Raisi’s approach to foreign relations has been to beat the isolation and economic war the United States has been trying to impose on Iran (and which the editor of this site supports whilst professing concern for the Iranian people) by fixing and enhancing ties with as many other countries as possible, prioritising those in the region. As well as making peace with Arab states, he has reached out to Africa, China, Russia and Latin America. At the same time, he has de-escalated tensions with the United States on certain issues and is holding out for another nuclear deal.
“Ayatollah Khamenei stated that he has supported administrations with various ideologies for over three decades and, in addition to supporting the current administration, he wanted to commend their efforts.” https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488545/Leader-lauds-Raisi-administration-for-foreign-policies
An important reminder of the role of the President in foreign policy (often portrayed as powerless by opponents of the Islamic Republic). Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rouhani all made efforts to improve relations with the West, whereas Ahmadinejad and Raisi prioritised reaching out to the rest of the world. Khatami, on balance, has had the most successful foreign policy repairing broken ties with Europe (the legacy of Rafsanjani) and getting the Americans to lift some sanctions. He also improved relations with regional states as well as with Russia and China. Here is a good article on how Khatami transformed Iran’s diplomacy: https://repository.library.carleton.ca/concern/etds/d791sh24m
“Iran, under Khatami, experienced the most peaceful relations with the international community since the inception of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.”
However, if Raisi can reach a new nuclear deal with the United States, and it sticks, he will go down as the most successful president of the Islamic Republic. Even resorting full ties with Egypt, as the Iranian government has stated it is working towards, would be a formidable achievement.
Nobel Foundation reverses, invites Iran to 2023 Prize Ceremony: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/nobel-foundation-reverses-invites-iran-2023-prize-ceremony
Iran’s oil output, exports rise as Washington, Tehran talk: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/irans-oil-output-exports-rise-washington-tehran-talk-2023-08-31/
“Analysts said the higher exports appear to be the result of Iran’s success in evading U.S. sanctions and Washington’s discretion in enforcing them as the two countries seek better relations…….SVB International, a consultant, estimates Iran’s oil production increased in August to 3.15 million barrels per day (bpd), the highest since 2018, with crude oil and condensate exports at just under 2 million bpd. Iran is on the path to recover its pre-sanctions oil production,” said SVB’s Sara Vakhshouri.”
A note about how foreign/security policy is decided in the Islamic Republic: https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/apr/01/supreme-national-security-council-iran
“Iran’s national security policymaking is an opaque process involving both official branches of government and informal influence networks. The one formal body that brings most of those influencers together is the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Established in 1989 by Article 176 of Iran’s constitution, the Council has three responsibilities: determining national security policies, ensuring that domestic policies align with national security policies, and marshalling resources to defend Iran from external and internal threats. All SNSC decisions must ultimately be confirmed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but the body’s deliberations shape the policy recommendations that go to his office.”
The SNSC is chaired by the President and made up of government ministers, military leaders and the other two heads of government. The Leader has two representatives attending also. The Majlis also plays a role in foreign policy as it can pass laws relating to security matters (like the nuclear program) and is required to ratify treaties between countries. Another body influencing decisions is the Expediency Council which advises the Leadership on both domestic and foreign policy. It is also a think tank for the government.
[Editor’s Note: In fact, as the graph shows, Iran’s recovery in 2020-2022 was limited, given the contraction of almost 5% in 2018-2019.]
Iran’s economic recovery from U.S sanctions has been fairly robust for 3 years now: https://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/Iranian%20GDP%20Growth%202015-2022.png
The economy and government is less dependent on oil revenues, an unexpected outcome, that makes for versatile growth in the future.
[Editor’s Note: This comment is deceptive in blaming Hassan Rouhani, President from 2013 to 2021, for the downturn in Iran’s relations with Gulf States. That downturn had far more to do with other actors in the Iranian system — notably the Supreme Leader, who controlled foreign policy, and the Revolutionary Guards — with the actions of Saudi and UAE leaders, and with cases such as the war in Yemen and Iran’s backing of the Assad regime in Syria.]
Leader praises Raisi for his foreign policy: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488545/Leader-lauds-Raisi-administration-for-foreign-policies
In a dig at the policies of the former administration, Khamenei “criticized the perception of some politicians that limit interaction with the world and only deem relations with a handful of Western countries worthy.” Under Rouhani, Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours deteriorated considerably even if relations with the West improved. However, the expansion of the nuclear program under Ahmadinejad, and the fallout of the Iraq war and Arab Spring, was the principal cause of the downturn. Under Khatami, ties were much better.
[Editor’s Note: The comment is accurate to some respect about regional developments, but its portrayal of the Iranian system and Rouhani should be seen as no more than an attempt to cheerlead for the Raisi Government.]
The downturn in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE was because of the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program and fallout of the Iraq war in which Iran exerted influence over the Shia-led government. The Arab Spring also led to Iran intervening in Syria and Yemen to support its allies. President Rouhani continued these policies from the Ahmadinejad era but did nothing to allay the concerns of Iran’s southern neighbours. He prioritised relations with the West instead. Iran’s foreign policy also isn’t controlled by any one person or branch (the Leadership, Revolutionary Guards and Majlis all have a role). However, it is the President that sets the agenda and overall approach being the head of the Supreme National Security Council. Raisi deserves and has taken credit for the improvement in Iran’s international standing.
[Editor’s Note: This is the Iranian regime’s line from one of its State media outlets.]
United States returned to negotiating table after unrest faded away: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488504/Enemy-returned-to-negotiating-table-after-unrest-faded-away
“When the enemy saw that the riots failed with the help and presence of people on the scene, which we have witnessed in all fields, they immediately sent us a message that they want to return to the negotiation table.”
U.S officials are on record as saying they were not interested in talking to Tehran but “supporting the Iranian people” at the height of the unrest. The western media claimed that a “revolution” was happening in Iran even though the vast majority of Iranians did not take part.
Tehran Times reveals the confidential memo informing Malley of the decision to suspend him for mishandling classified information: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488429/Final-Say
On Twitter, former American officials are bewildered at how the Iranian newspaper obtained this information.
Reasons for Robert Malley’s suspension revealed: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488429/Final-Say
“The DS Office of Personnel Security (DS/SI/PSS) has received information regarding you that raises serious security concerns and can be disqualifying under National Security Adjudicative Guidelines E (Personal Conduct), K (Handling of Protected Information), and M (Use of Information Technology),” Smart tersely told Malley.”
Ali Ansari claims Iranian economy on brink of collapse: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2023/08/24/irans-economy-brink-of-soviet-style-collapse/
Inflation falls below 40% in Iran: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/488445/Inflation-rate-falls-0-8
The IMF predicts inflation will fall to 30% next year. The currency remains stable at just below 50,000 tomans to the USD.
Iranians hopeful of better ties with the U.S: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-1953-cia-backed-coup-in-iran-continues-to-complicate-and-keep-tensions-high-with-u-s
Lower tensions with the U.S. “will bring more money for my business,” said Hossein, 47, who runs a canteen for cab drivers in southern Tehran. “Now taxi drivers spend less compared to the past years and it is because of these bad relations, sanctions.”
“I know about this bitter history but it should come to end sometime soon,” added Majid Shamsi, who works as a parcel carrier in central Tehran. “Young people in Iran seek a better life and it cannot come as a result of enmity with” the U.S.
“Iran today should accept a deal with the U.S. like what it did to release dual nationals,” added teacher Reza Seifi, 26. “I need it for my better future, for a better future for all.”
“I dream that the supreme leader allows talks and better relations with the U.S.,” said Mohsen, 29, a furniture shop salesman in northern Tehran. “He allowed the restoration of ties with Saudi Arabia. He can allow the same for the U.S.”
It is worth noting how events in the region, and the recent “understanding” may be leading to a permanent US-Iran agreement broader than just the nuclear issue. Take a look at Pompeo’s 12 demands for just such a deal: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/21/mike-pompeo-speech-what-are-the-12-demands-given-to-iran
1.Declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear programme and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
That appears to be nearing its conclusion.
2. Stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing, including closing its heavy water reactor.
That is not going to happen but Iran has accepted not reprocessing plutonium.
3. Provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
That seems to have been agreed upon except for military sites.
4.End its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
Never going to happen but Iran may accept some restrictions.
5. Release all US citizens as well as citizens of US partners and allies.
That appears to be happening.
6. End support to Middle East “terrorist” groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Never going to happen but Iran could limit this support.
7. Respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilisation and reintegration of Shia militias.
That may be doable but the militias remain Iraq’s best defense.
8, End its military support for the Houthi rebels and work towards a peaceful, political settlement in Yemen.
That appears to be happening.
9. Withdraw all forces under Iran’s command throughout the entirety of Syria.
That may happen contingent upon the withdrawal of US troops
10. End support for the Taliban and other “terrorists” in Afghanistan and the region and cease harbouring senior al-Qaeda leaders.
The Taliban are in charge and Iran is having issues with them.
11. End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for “terrorists” and “militant” partners around the world.
Unclear what this means.
12. End its threatening behaviour against its neighbours, many of whom are US allies, including its threats to destroy Israel and its firing of missiles at Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and threats to international shipping and destructive cyberattacks.
The peace agreements and understanding seem to have resolved this.