PHOTO: The UN envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura


A curious thing happened this week to the UN envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura — he presented his new plan to solve the Syrian crisis on Tuesday, and almost no one noticed.

That oversight might be because, within 24 hours, the proposal had been thrown back in de Mistura’s face by all parties in the crisis from Iran’s allies Russia and Iran to the Syrian opposition.

The centerpiece of the latest initiative of the envoy, who assumed his role in July 2014, is a “Transitional Governing Body” with “full executive powers”. Reflecting the Syrian people “on a non-sectarian, non-discriminatory basis”, it will have representatives from the Government, the opposition, and civil society. It will supervise a Joint Military Council which will “coordinate with existing local military structures”.

Those ideas are far from new. They have been part of every UN plan since the Geneva Communique of June 2012. What was distinctive was De Mistura’s proposal for the future of President Assad and his inner circle.

The envoy suggested that Assad should be converted into a ceremonial Head of State with no executive powers. Meanwhile, “as a means to build confidence in the process, the Interim Agreement will include a list of 120 names of persons who for reasons of their role in the conflict shall not hold office during the transition”. State institutions would be “preserved and reformed”, while a commission would “pursue the immediate release of relevant detainees and the search for disappeared persons”.

So the dilemma of what to do about President Assad would be solved, while maintained governance in Syria. Assad would no longer have any executive authority, but he could avoid the “defeat” of being removed completely — or even facing war crimes charges for his role in the hundreds of thousands who have been killed and millions who have been displaced since March 2011.

Russia and Iran Dismiss the Envoy

Problem solved? Not quite.

Even before De Mistura’s proposal appeared, Assad’s allies Russia and Iran ripped it up.

On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Assad must remain as the “legitimate” ruler of Syria:

The demand for Assad’s resignation as a precondition for the struggle against terrorism is completely unrealistic and counterproductive.

This demand is currently present in the position of a whole range of our partners. We will be able to work efficiently should this demand be lifted.

See Syria Analysis: Rumors of Russia’s Military Involvement Miss A Bigger Political Story

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian followed on Tuesday, after meeting De Mistura in Beirut: “President Assad should be a part of political settlement for the Syrian crisis.”

The rebuke was especially stinging because it repeated De Mistura’s own formula from this spring that Assad was “essential for any political solution” to the conflict.

Well-placed sources confirm to EA that the Syrian opposition and rebels would have been no kinder to de Mistura’s revised plan. Even though it moved Assad from being an “essential” leader to a “ceremonial” one, it still maintained him as a figure of authority in Damascus. The provision to remove 120 members of the regime was too vague, with no revelation of names or the procedure to ensure they were stripped of influence. Perhaps most importantly, Assad, his brother and prominent military commander Maher, and other leading officials would escape any punishment for their role in killings, torture, detentions, and disappearances.

However, there was no need to express these objections. Iran and Russia had already done the not-so-hard work of consigning de Mistura’s proposal to oblivion. Almost no one in the international media even noticed that the plan had been put forth.

A Useless Envoy?

The above summary might seem harsh on the UN envoy. He had recognized the error of keeping Assad at the center of the political resolution, and his proposal is seeking mechanisms for transitional justice as well as a transitional governing authority, avoiding a collapse of institutions in Damascus.

However, de Mistura had put himself beyond effectiveness months ago. His plan for a “freeze” in Aleppo city as a prelude to talks and more ceasefires was poorly thought-out and presented. While the Assad regime gave a cautious welcome, the opposition and rebels saw the plan as only freeing up the Syrian military to wage campaigns elsewhere in Syria — and allowing the Syrian air force to continue indiscriminate bombing — while offering nothing for political disputes and issues of justice.

The opposition’s response for an expanded “freeze” in northwest Syria, to cover opposition-held areas as well as regime territory, should have given de Mistura an indication about the issues. But — at least at the time — he did not seem to recognize the clue.

Instead, the envoy sealed his fate with the “Assad is essential” line. The regime celebrated a recognition of supposed legitimacy, while the opposition and rebels resolved never again to work with de Mistura. Russia and Iran took a lead from the envoy’s statement to pursue their initiative from late June for high-level talks, but Saudi Arabia — which shared the opposition’s view of de Mistura — blocked that in mid-August.

The reality has long been that a “resolution” of the Syrian crisis will come at some point on the battlefield, rather than the negotiating table. Perhaps that absolves De Mistura of responsibility — there is little that even his best-laid plans could have done — or perhaps that compounds his failure, never seeing that reality as well as many other aspects of the Syrian situation.