PHOTO: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his deputy Abbas Araqchi
At the end of July, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met staff of State broadcaster IRIB to discuss the July 14 nuclear deal with the 5+1 Powers.
That off-the-record conversation — part of the Government’s campaign to get approval of the agreement — would have aroused little attention. But then someone at IRIB, without Araqchi’s permission, published his comments on the outlet’s website.
Araqchi responded immediately, claiming that the account — publication of which was “contrary to national interests and security” and “incompatible with professional ethics” — contained numerous errors. IRIB retracted the story a few hours later, and other Iranian sites which had republished the text also removed it.
However, other sites like IranWire had already posted extracts from the conversation. Cutting through the public rhetoric around the deal, they offer one of the clearest pictures to date of the Iranian regime’s position before and after the deal. The lessons are significant not only for Tehran, but also for Washington as the Obama Administration combats its own foes in Congress, the media, and “think tanks” to get approval of the agreement.
1. The US and Its Allies Reached Their Fundamental Goal
Perhaps Araqchi’s most telling comment was the confirmation that the US and the other 5+1 Powers (Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia) were successful in fulfilling their essential objective, as Iran accept long-term limitations on its enriched uranium and nuclear facilities:
The main demand of the other side was to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons….We had no problem with that, and granted it to the enemy…meaning that we provided trust, trust that we will not be moving towards the bomb. W
We granted this to the other side in two ways, by accepting certain limitations and certain supervisions.
The statement is a clear refutation of the narrative of US anti-deal critics that the Obama Administration made concession after concession to the Islamic Republic. Araqchi’s presentation of Iranian achievements was limited to “we gave up the atomic bomb, a bomb which we did not want and considered forbidden”.
The admission is also a reason why the Minister was so agitated about the leak: the Rouhani Government may have been negotiating from weakness, but to get approval of the deal, it needs to project strength.
2. Iran Was Worried About US Military Action
Iran’s weakness was not just from the effects of US-led economic pressure. Tehran also worried about American military action:
For 10 years they [the Americans] tried everything and used military threats to a maximum level. Maybe people are not aware of the details, but our Revolutionary Guards and military friends know that there were nights in [2006-2007] when we were worried that by the morning Iran would be surrounded.
And the threat continued during the Obama years: “An attack on Iran only depended on the political will of Mr. Obama, who could decide to strike, and they would.”
3. A Consolation Present for the Supreme Leader
The extent of Iranian concessions is highlighted — perhaps inadvertently — by Araqchi’s narrative of how the Supreme Leader remained in control of Tehran’s position throughout the negotiations.
But — having given up 98% of Iran’s enriched uranium and most of its centrifuges, accepted limits on research and development, and agreed to no removal of sanctions until Tehran’s implementation was verified — Ayatollah Khamenei got only one, and apparently only one consolation from Washington:
The Supreme Leader expressly ordered that 1,000 centrifuges remain at Fordoo [enrichment facility]….We were worried sick that this wasn’t possible, because they [the Americans] wouldn’t consent to even one centrifuge in that location….What happened at the negotiations and how they came to consent to it is another story. It was a blessing from God.
While the US relented on its initial demand that Fordoos be closed, the centrifuges cannot be linked to an operational enrichment program, and their development is restricted.
4. Iran Made Mistakes That Raised Suspicions
Araqchi made a series of statements that effectively endorsed the 5+1’s concerns about the Iranian nuclear program, particularly given diplomatic mis-steps by Tehran. He said of the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency:
We failed at some points, and were late in informing them. Some of these past mistakes were combined with trumped-up charges and unfounded allegations to make a case against our country, which [IAEA head Yukiya] Amano later referred to as “possible military dimensions”….A purely technical case was turned into a political issue.
The Minister acknowledged that Iran had tried to keep its second enrichment plant at Fordoo secret in 2009, but then faced US revelation of the construction:
When they discovered Fordoo, we were aware of this and knew that they wanted to make an announcmement about it, so we preempted this. [Iran’s envoy Ali Asghar] Soltanieh was ordered to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency; he disclosed this information in a letter to [IAEA head Mohamed] El-Baradei.
And Araqchi confirmed that US claims of an Iranian “break-out” capability — at least in principle — for a nuclear bomb within months were not exaggerated:
It is not important to return to the situation where we have eight or 10 tons [of enriched uranium]. Even one ton is enough to make a bomb. Of course, we are not going down that road, and we consider the bomb to be forbidden.
5. US Is Right to Guard Against A Shift by Iran Towards A Military Nuclear Program
Having acknowledged past errors raising suspicion, Araqchi then accepted the concern of Washington for firm measures in the deal to block any pursuit of a militarized nuclear program:
They [the Americans] are worried that future political developments in Iran could cause the re-activation of the program. They are afraid of this, so are trying not to be left empty-handed. They want to keep sanctions as long as possible, so both sides can continue the process of building trust.
6. An Iranian Contest with the US in Non-Nuclear Arena
In line with Iran’s tough rhetoric about the crises in the Middle East, Araqchi indicated that Tehran saw its possibilities in the political contest with the Americans:
Our hostility towards their tyrannical system and their enmity towards the Islamic Republic, its ideals and its values will continue. You must illustrate these points in every way possible, so that that people will not become frustrated.
He specifically referred to Iran’s approach towards Hezbollah, the Lebanese organization which is also fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria: “We said that we cannot stop giving arms to Hezbollah, and we’re not ready to sacrifice it to our nuclear program. So we will continue doing it.”
Araqchi even portrayed Iranian concessions in the deal as the product of Tehran’s success with Middle Eastern movements:
[US Secretary of State] Kerry said a few times: “You are the victim of your own successes in the region. You have had successes in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and have gained influence. Under these conditions, if we lift the arms embargo against you, we would kill the deal and we would no longer be able to defend it — not with our own allies, not with Arabs, not with Israel and not with Congress. There will be no deal. So we have to keep the arms embargo.”
7.Iran Lost — So It Can Win in the Future
In the end, Araqchi admitted that Iran had “lost” with its concessions in the negotiations, although this — in an unspecified way — would ensure that it was successful in the future:
The troublesome details were the costs that we had to pay. But can you show us any [military] operations that did not entail similar troublesome details? When it came to successful operations, did we say how many tanks we lost or how many people were martyred instead of saying what we achieved? Would have we said, for example, “Mr. Commander, it was not 100 [martyrs], but 120”?
During the Sacred Defense [the 1980s war with Iraq], several operations failed, but we never said we were defeated. At most, we said that we had not been victorious. This was the phrase you used in the news.
