Fredrik Dahl, Reuters, May 6, 2013: “Iran May Be Limiting Growth in Sensitive Atom Stockpile — Diplomats”
Fredrik Dahl, Reuters, August 19, 2013: “Iran May be Limiting Sensitive Nuclear Stockpile: Diplomats”
May 6, 2013 Lead Paragraph: “Iran appears to be pressing ahead in using some of its most sensitive nuclear material to make reactor fuel, diplomats said on Monday, a step that could help buy time for diplomacy between Tehran and world powers.”
August 19, 2013 Lead Paragraph: “Iran appears to be holding back growth of its most sensitive nuclear stockpile by continuing to convert some of it into reactor fuel, diplomats said on Monday, potentially giving more time for negotiation with world powers.”
Why is Reuters recycling a thrre-month-old story, in places word-for-word? Indeed, why is it recycling a nine-month-old story, “Iran Nuclear Fuel Nove May Ease War Fears — for Now“?
This is a story of how a reporter in Vienna and his “unnamed Western diplomat” sources can carry out a propaganda exercise in a major news agency by running the same story over and over, despite almost no new information. This is also a story of how the presentation of “threat” from Iran’s nuclear program can be transformed into an expression of Western willingness to negotiate with Tehran.
Fredrik Dahl has been a long-time favourite for unnamed diplomats wishing to express their opinions on the Islamic Republic: “Iran Nuclear Report Expected to Expose Possible Weapon Development“; “Iran Pushes Ahead With Nuclear Plant That Worries West“; “UN inspectors See New Centrifuges at Iran Nuclear Site, Diplomat Says“.
However, on May 6, there was a marked change in tone in Dahl’s reporting. As the headline and lead paragraph emphasized, the Iranians were now “buying time for diplomacy” — avoiding a possible military attack on its nuclear facilities — by converting much of its 20% enriched uranium stock into oxide powder, which has no potential for military use:
Since Iran in 2010 began refining uranium to a fissile concentration of 20 percent – a relatively short technical step away from the level required for nuclear arms – it has produced more than the 240-250 kg which would be needed for one weapon.
But while the stockpile has expanded, Iran has still kept it below the Israeli “red line” by converting part of the uranium gas into oxide powder in order, Tehran says, to yield fuel for a medical research reactor in the Iranian capital.
Three diplomats said they believed Iran had continued this activity – thereby slowing the growth of the amount of 20 percent uranium gas – since the U.N. atomic agency issued its last report on Tehran’s nuclear programme in February.
“Our impression is that it is fairly steady what they are doing,” one Western official said. Another envoy said: “I think they are trying to demonstrate that their conversion is a significant amount, an amount that (Iran believes) should ease the concern of the international community.”
If this is confirmed in the next report on Iran by the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), expected in late May, the increase in the holding of 20 percent gas will be less than the production, which has amounted to about 15 kg per month.
There is no doubt that this conversion constitutes “news” — even if the Iranians had been doing since summer 2012.
What is intriguing is that Dahl still considers it “news” when he writes it again, to be re-printed in almost exact form on August 19:
Since Iran in 2010 began enriching uranium to a 20 percent concentration of the fissile isotope, it has produced more than the 240-250 kg that would be needed for one weapon.
But it has kept the stockpile below the stated Israeli “red line” by converting part of the uranium gas into oxide powder in order, it says, to yield fuel for a medical research reactor.
The diplomats, accredited to the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Iran might even have stepped up this conversion in recent months.
If this is confirmed in the IAEA’s quarterly report, due around August 27-28, the inventory of 20 percent gas will rise by less than the output, which has been about 15 kg per month.
So are there any differences between the May and August articles?
Yes. And that is where the answer to the question, “Why?”, can be seen — provided, of course, you read both stories.
In November 2012, Dahl put this warning high in his story:
“[Converting back from oxide powder to uranium stock] would take a bit of time, but not more than a month or two, using technology the Iranians have already demonstrated that they have mastered,” a Western envoy said.
In May, he followed his optimistic passage about conversion with an equally-long caution:
Critics say Iran is trying to achieve the ability to make atomic bombs. The Islamic Republic denies this, saying says it needs nuclear power for energy generation and medical purposes.
But while the uranium conversion activity may postpone any decision by Israel on whether to strike Iranian nuclear sites, the diplomats made clear Tehran must do much more in order to allay Western suspicions about its atomic programme.
“Simply converting is not enough,” one of them said.
Turning uranium gas into oxide powder in order to make fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor may be just a temporary positive development because the process could be reversible, Western experts say.
Iran could reconvert its entire inventory of 20 percent enriched oxide powder into gas “in a matter of a few weeks,” said Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment think-tank.
“Reconversion is not hard,” said Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank.
“Once the initial hiccups are overcome, the chemical process is straightforward.”
In August’s version of the story, there is no such warning near the top of the article. The cautionary section — and the “Western experts” — of May’s version are gone, replaced with the note, “Western diplomats say Iran needs to do much more to allay suspicions about its atomic program. They note that uranium oxide powder can be converted back into gas form relatively quickly.”
Thus an article in May, following the stalemate in the most recent talks between the 5+1 Powers (US, Britain, Germany, France, China, and Russia) and Iran, was sceptical while keeping the door to diplomacy open.
In August, weeks before a possible resumption of discussions between the 5+1 Powers and Iran, the line for diplomacy and talks to reach a settlement has been reinforced by a muting of scepticism.
Could it be that Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, has some PR allies amongst the Western diplomatic activities…and in a Reuters journalist who used to be prominent in his warnings of Tehran’s imminent threat?