The funeral procession of assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran, August 1, 2024


Co-published with The Conversation:


EA on Australia’s ABC and Times Radio: From 9-11 to the Middle East and Iran in 2024

EA on Irish and Indian Media: Israel’s Killings of Hamas Leader Haniyeh and Hezbollah Commander Shukr

UPDATES: Hamas Leader Haniyeh Killed in Iran — Is Israel Responsible?


The missile that struck a building in southern Beirut on Tuesday, killing Hezbollah’s senior military commander Fuad Shukr, was anticipated by many analysts.

Three days earlier, a Hezbollah rocket — likely missing its military target in northern Israel — struck a football pitch in the Israeli-controlled Syrian Golan height. Twelve juveniles, aged 10 to 20, were killed.

With the Beirut strike, Israel carried out its pledge of a “harsh but contained” response.

What was not anticipated was the sequel hours later. Another strike targeted an apartment block in Tehran. It killed the political leader of the Gazan organization Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, only hours after he had met both Iran’s Supreme Leader and its new President Masoud Pezeshkian.

The Israel Defense Forces followed up on Thursday with the declaration that it had killed Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s military commander and the planner of the October 7 mass killings in Israel, in an airstrike in southern Gaza on July 13.

In April, after an exchange of “demonstration” missile strikes with Iran, the Israel leadership warned, “We chose not to hit your nuclear sites this time, but we could have done worse.”

Three months later, they fulfilled that pledge and effectively asked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, “Now what are you going to do?”

How Will Iran’s Regime Respond?

Iran had attempted to send its own message in the April skirmish, sending around 120 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles, and 170 drones. Because the Iranians telegraphed the punch, notifying Israeli allies in advance, almost all of the munitions were intercepted and those that landed were on a base in a sparsely-populated area.

Still, Tehran had tried to draw a line with Israel, which had been assassinating Iranian commanders in Syria. In that respect, the demonstration worked: none of Tehran’s senior officers have been killed since then.

But Israel’s leadership, political and military, was waiting. And when Hezbollah made the serious mistake of killing youngsters playing football, the plan was rolled out.

Not only did they eliminate one of Hamas’s most important officials — and, significantly, the man involved in negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza — they embarrassed Iran’s regime.

This was supposed to be the week when the Supreme Leader would regain legitimacy amid a protracted economic crisis, social unrest, and historically-low voter turnout. Having stage-managed the surprise Presidential victory of a “reformist”, the inauguration of Pezeshkian was designed to highlight a resurgent Iran with scores of international leaders paying tribute.

But now the regime is having to preside over Haniyeh’s funeral and the exposure of its weakness.

The Supreme Leader blustered that it was “Tehran’s duty” to deliver “harsh punishment”. But less than two hours later, 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref undid the threat: there would be no Iranian escalation of conflict across the region.

For Iran’s options appear to be limited. They could encourage more attacks by Yemen’s Houthi insurgents, who have struck Red Sea shipping and who killed an Israeli civilian in a drone strike last week. They could lift restraints on the militias which they lead in Iraq and Syria, permitting rocket assaults on US military personnel.

But even these limited operations carry significant risks. Israel has already responded to the Houthi killing with airstrikes on the insurgents’ positions in Yemen. After the Iran-led militias carried out more than 150 attacks since October 7, US strikes on the fighters in January ended the barrages: the head of Iran’s Quds Forces told its proxies to cease and desist.

In a direct confrontation, including a ground war, Israel would have far more firepower than Hezbollah. It could finally break Lebanon, which is an economic basket case and socially fragile.

So Iran’s likely course of action is to play the victim, supporting the even greater victim of the Gazan people in Israel’s 10 months of mass killings. That political and diplomatic approach would seek to peel off international support for the Israelis and to give the Iranians leverage with Arab and Muslim countries.

Meanwhile in Israel and Gaza….

Israel’s political and military assessment was likely accompanied by the personal calculus of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

After 10 months of Israeli mass killing in Gaza following Hamas’s mass killing and abductions inside Israel, Netanyahu was in deep trouble. He was not close to the return of around 120 hostages, alive or dead, still held by Hamas. He could not provide the fulfillment of his pledge to “destroy” the Gazan faction. Instead, Israeli troops appeared to be stuck in perpetual operations.

The country is being riven. Hard-right ministers are demanding expansion of assaults and “cleansing” of Gaza, their supporters breaking into one military base with Hamas detainees and another hosting the Israel Defense Forces military court.

Anti-war protests are building. So are the rallies around the families of hostages, as they demand a resolution of the situation of their loved ones.

A possible route out for Netanyahu is the acceptance of the international plan, heralded by the US, for a three-phase settlement leading to a ceasefire. But to do so would expose the Prime Minister to the risk of early elections and a resumption of his prosecution over bribery charges. So Netanyahu has effectively stonewalled any agreement by saying, in Orwellian fashion, that the ceasefire plan would not mean an end to Israel’s military operations.

With the high-profile killing of “enemies” in Haniyeh and possibly Shukr, Netanyahu may have bought himself some time.

But time for what? The ceasefire option is likely off the table for the near-future. Haniyeh will be replaced today, likely by Khaled Meshaal, the former political head of Hamas. More importantly, despite Israeli attempts to eliminate him, Hamas’s military leader Yahya Sinwar is still in Gaza. So is Mohammad Deif, the architect of the October 7 attacks.

Senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri declared in defiance, “Hamas is a concept and an institution and not persons. Hamas will continue on this path regardless of the sacrifices and we are confident of victory.”

So if their attacks in Gaza stretches into an 11th month, a 12th, a second year, what do Netanyahu and Israel’s leadership do then? Who else can they target with assassination to put off the reckoning of a war without apparent end?

Assassination of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders is a gamble for Benjamin Netanyahu that buys him time but risks wider wars

Scott Lucas, University College Dublin

The missile that struck a building in southern Beirut on Tuesday, killing Hezbollah’s senior military commander Fuad Shukr, had been widely anticipated. Three days earlier, a Hezbollah rocket – which had no doubt missed its military target in northern Israel – struck a football pitch in the Israeli-controlled Syrian Golan Heights. Twelve young people between the ages of ten and 20 were killed.

With the Beirut strike targeting a single Hezbollah leader, Israel carried out its pledge of a “harsh response” while also keeping it relatively contained in terms of the conflict between the two sides.

What had not been anticipated was the sequel hours later. Another airstrike targeted an apartment block in Tehran. It killed the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, only hours after he had met both Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and the country’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

It’s a killing that has significantly upped the ante between Jerusalem and Tehran, after a period of business as usual in the skewed calculus of relations between the two countries. While it has claimed responsibility for the strike that killed Shukr, the Israeli government has not admitted it was behind the death of Haniyeh in Iran and said it had no comment to make. But a representative of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) posted on X (formerly Twitter) that it had killed another top Hamas commander, Mohammed Deif, in an airstrike in southern Gaza on July 13.

The past year has seen a series of tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and various Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, none of them particularly deadly in the scheme of things. These were episodes perhaps best exemplified by Iran’s launch, in April, of 120 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles and 170 drones. Tehran took care to notify Israeli allies in advance. As a result almost all of the munitions were intercepted. Those that landed were on a base in a sparsely populated area.

But Israel’s leadership, political and military, was waiting. And when Hezbollah made the serious mistake of killing youngsters playing football, the plan was rolled out and Haniyeh was eliminated. Not only did they get rid of one of Hamas’s most important officials – and, significantly, the man involved in negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza – they embarrassed Iran’s regime.

Tehran to ‘play the victim’?

This was supposed to be the week when the supreme leader would regain legitimacy amid a protracted economic crisis, social unrest, and historically low voter turnout. Having stage-managed the surprise presidential victory of a “reformist”, the inauguration of Pezeshkian was designed to highlight a resurgent Iran with scores of international leaders paying tribute.

But now the regime is having to preside over Haniyeh’s funeral and the exposure of its weakness.

The supreme leader blustered that it was “Iran’s duty” to deliver “harsh punishment”. But less than two hours later, Iran’s first vice-president, Mohammad Reza Aref, undid the threat, with a statement on Iran’s official state media channel that there would be no Iranian escalation of conflict across the region.

All of which makes sense for Tehran. In a direct confrontation, including a ground war, Israel would have far more firepower than Hezbollah. It could finally break Lebanon, which is an economic basket case and socially fragile.

So Iran’s likely course of action is to play the victim, joining the even greater victim of the Gazan people after Israel’s ten months of mass killings. That political and diplomatic approach would seek to peel off international support for the Israelis and to give the Iranians leverage with Arab and Muslim countries.

Meanwhile in Israel and Gaza

Israel’s political and military assessment would have been accompanied by a degree of personal calculus by the prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After ten months of conflict in Gaza, Netanyahu was in deep trouble. He was not close to the return of around 120 hostages, alive or dead. He could not provide the fulfilment of his pledge to “destroy” the Gazan faction. Instead, Israeli troops appeared to be stuck in perpetual operations in full view of a mainly disapproving world.

The country is being riven. Hard-right ministers are demanding he expand the Israel Defense Forces assaults and “cleansing” of Gaza. Their supporters recently broke into one military base where IDS troops were being held on charges of abusing prisoners. Some entered the Israel Defense Forces military court where the cases were being held.

At the same time, anti-war protests are building among the civilian population. So are the rallies around the families of hostages, as they demand a resolution of the situation of their loved ones.

One possible route out of this mess for Netanyahu is the acceptance of the international plan, heralded by the US, for a three-phase settlement leading to a ceasefire. But to do so would expose the prime minister to the risk of early elections and a resumption of his prosecution over bribery charges. So he has effectively stonewalled any agreement by saying, in Orwellian fashion, that the ceasefire plan would not mean an end to Israel’s military operations.

So with the high-profile killing of “enemies” in Haniyeh and Shukr, Netanyahu may have bought himself some time.

But time for what? The ceasefire option is likely off the table for the near future. Haniyeh will be replaced today, likely by Khaled Meshaal, the former political head of Hamas. More importantly, despite Israeli attempts to eliminate him, Hamas’s military leader Yahya Sinwar is still in Gaza. Another senior Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri declared defiantly:

Hamas is a concept and an institution and not persons. Hamas will continue on this path regardless of the sacrifices and we are confident of victory.

So if their attacks in Gaza stretch into an 11th month, a 12th, a second year – what do Netanyahu and Israel’s leadership do then? Who else can they target with assassination to put off the reckoning of a war without apparent end?The Conversation