Palestinians inspect destruction after an Israeli airstrike on a house in the Nuseirat refugee camp, west of Gaza City, September 27, 2025 (Ali Hassan/Flash90)
EA on International Outlets: The Trump-Netanyahu Ultimatum to Hamas
I answer five questions, posed by The Conversation UK, about the response of Arab and Muslim countries to the 20-point “plan” for Gaza presented by Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — including the ultimatum to Hamas to accept or face Israel overrunning the rest of the Strip.
Which Arab and Muslim countries support Trump’s peace plan?
Most Arab and Muslim countries are backing the 20-point sketch. Officials from these states reportedly met their US counterparts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last week to discuss Trump’s framework to end the war.
The foreign ministers of eight states – Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and Egypt – then welcomed Trump’s “sincere efforts” towards ending the war in a joint statement on September 29. They asserted their “confidence in his ability to find a path to peace”.
There are multiple reasons for their backing. Arab and Muslim leaders may just want the mass killing of Gaza’s civilians to stop. The Gaza Health Ministry says over 66,000 Palestinians have now been killed since the war began two years ago.
At the same time, they are concerned about regional security. Israel has launched strikes on Lebanon, Syria and Yemen in recent weeks. And it smashed Qatar’s sovereignty on September 9 with an airstrike on the capital Doha, trying to assassinate Hamas negotiators.
These leaders are not fans of Hamas, with some of them perceiving the organization as a threat to internal stability in their countries. Privately, they may welcome the degradation of the group. But publicly they have to express solidarity with the Palestinian people.
So how can these countries curb Israel’s military operations? The approach cannot come directly from them. Even as Qatar was mediating peace talks, Netanyahu’s ministers were declaring that it was a supporter of “terrorism” because of its role in hosting Hamas political leadership. Israel had to be reached through its essential backer: Donald Trump.
Feeding ideas to Trump officials such as his envoy, the real estate developer Steve Witkoff, the Arab and Muslim countries could get some leverage against Netanyahu. And chasing lucrative economic, technological and AI deals with the US, they could play up Trump’s self-declared image of peacemaker.
What role have these states agreed to play as part of the plan?
Like the 20-point sketch, the role of Arab and Muslim states in delivering peace to Gaza is far vaguer than their motives. They would have input into the international “Board of Peace”, nominally headed by Trump, supervising the “temporary, transitional government of Palestinian technocrats”.
They would also be involved in the development of an “international stabilisation force”. The Trump proposal states that this force will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will work to secure border areas. But it is unclear if Arab states will contribute security personnel.
There could be economic benefits for these countries from the reconstruction of Gaza with a long-term ceasefire and stability. But those possibilities are unclear in the interim. Trump’s sketch talked only about “the convening of experts with experience in constructing modern Middle East cities” to consider plans “attracting investments and creating jobs”.
Are these governments out of step with public sentiment in their countries?
Arab and Muslim governments have been maneuvering between Israel, the US and Palestine for many years. They have also been walking a tightrope between external relationships and their publics.
Chide Israel too strongly and risk the loss of the “normalisation” project, with its economic and political benefits. Appear weak in the face of the Netanyahu government, and risk discontent and a loss of legitimacy with their constituents.
Those calculations have fed into the sketch. For the first time, there is a specific clause that Gazans should not be displaced for the development of Trump’s envisioned “Riviera of the Middle East” or for the vision of Netanyahu’s hard-right ministers of long-term Israeli occupation.
Arab and Muslim officials recently highlighted the danger of those Israeli ministers – and possibly Netanyahu – declaring annexation of the West Bank in response to the march of countries recognising a Palestinian state. The Trump administration responded by telling their Israeli allies that annexation was a red line which could not be crossed.
Does the two-state solution remain a red line for the Arab states?
Historically, Arab States have not necessarily put a priority on a two-state resolution. It was the US that propelled the Oslo process, which was supposed to bring about Palestinian self-determination in the form of a Palestinian state, all the way to failure at the Camp David summit in 2000.
In 2002, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made a proposal for all Arab states to recognise Israel in exchange for its complete withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. However, it was the US that again led publicly for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement until another failure in 2009 during the Obama Administration.
There has arguably been more emphasis in recent years among some Arab states on “normalization” rather than the two-state solution. But Israel’s campaign in Gaza, combined with the Trump administration’s fervent backing of the Netanyahu government, may have altered this.
Arab states have to evaluate if they are going to ride the international wave towards an emphasis on recognition of Palestine as a state. Alongside France, Saudi Arabia led a forum in New York in September on a two-state outcome.
Trump wants more states to normalize relations with Israel, naming Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as candidates. How likely is this?
This one is easy. The Netanyahu Government’s military approach towards Hamas, rather than an emphasis on political and economic measures to isolate the group, has put normalization beyond the acceptable for Middle Eastern states.
As long as Israel is killing, starving, displacing and dehumanizing Gaza’s civilians, the UAE and Bahrain will be cautious about their recognition of Israel in 2020. Any talk of expanding that recognition with other states – despite the bluster of Trump and Netanyahu – is a wish at best.
More likely, it is deceptive politics as Netanyahu banks on Hamas accepting the ultimatum – or having the pretext of a Hamas rejection for even more intense Israeli military operations in Gaza and an occupation for the foreseeable future.
