Iran’s Supreme Leader in a meeting with students in Tehran, November 3, 2025
I was approached on LinkedIn by the Iran State newspaper Iran Daily to answer questions about the Islamic Republic and the region in the aftermath of Israel’s 12-day war in June.
I agreed, with the proviso that I check my answers before publication. Iran Daily made only minor and acceptable revisions to my full-and-frank responses.
The version below is my original reply.
1. How do you assess the trajectory of regional developments in the Middle East after Israel’s illegal attack on Iran and the twelve-day war?
Geopolitics in Iran and the Middle East are like a kaleidoscope. An episode such as Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June will turn the situation, not just for the Islamic Republic and Israel but for other countries. And there will be other events that will also turn that kaleidoscope so we have new patterns of relationships.
From my perspective, Iran is in a weakened position, not just because of the war but also because of developments throughout the region since October 7, 2023. Hamas’ mass killing inside Israel on that day, followed by two years of Israel’s mass killing inside Gaza, interacted with climactic events in other countries.
Hezbollah was decimated in Lebanon by Israeli strikes, losing almost all of its senior leadership. The Assad regime suddenly fell in Syria in December 2024. Yemen’s Ansar Allah has also been weakened by Israel’s aerial attacks. Iraq has avoided the worst of the violence, but is taking a political path in which Iran’s long-time influence is diminished.
Iran’s nuclear program was seriously damaged by the Israeli war. The extent of the damage is still being withheld by the Iranian leadership, but best analyses indicate that the program’s development has been set back by at least a year.
Perhaps more importantly, the Israeli attacks effectively ended Iran’s talks with the Trump Administration about a resolution of nuclear issues. With that path closed off and with Iran’s continued conflict with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Islamic Republic is facing the imposition of “snapback” sanctions. These will add to economic difficulties.
Do you believe Iran and Israel might enter another round of conflict? If so, how intense do you expect it to be?
I do not expect Iran to instigate direct conflict with Israel. Instead, the leadership will seek to rebuild its position in other countries primarily through diplomatic, political, and economic measures — apart from Yemen, where it may try to continue some military assistance to Ansar Allah.
At this point, I do not expect Israel to launch another direct assault on Iran. The pretext of curbing the nuclear programme has been removed by June’s damage. The Trump Administration is currently leaning on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to push back hard-right ministers in his Cabinet who decide further confrontation, amid the fragile halt to mass killing in Gaza.
In your view, is the United States likely to become directly involved in a potential future conflict — and in what form?
If Israel was to renew a direct assault on Iran, the Trump Administration could become involved, as it did with its airstrikes on the Fordoo, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear complexes in June.
But I do not foresee the Administration seeking this involvement. Its emphasis at the moment is proclaiming the “ceasefire” in Gaza, which involves limiting the Israeli military for now.
More significant will be the Administration’s attempt to restart a process of “normalization” between Arab States, including those in the Gulf, and Israel. That will involve further maneuvers between the US and countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, in which Donald Trump and his family have large business investments.
How do you see the regional outlook after the Gaza–Israel agreement? Do you consider this agreement sustainable or fragile?
The Phase 1 of the “ceasefire” is shaky. It has already been broken twice by Israel, with the killing of more than 150 Gazans, and there are further Israeli attacks even as the ceasefire is supposedly restored. Only 24% of the aid mandated by Phase 1 is entering Gaza.
The declared Trump 20-point “plan” is only a sketch. That means there is a security vacuum in unoccupied areas of Gaza, which is filled by Hamas. This in turn means the Gazan group is unlikely to disarm.
It may be impossible to return the bodies of all the dead Israeli hostages, given the scale of destruction across the Strip. This will bolster the argument of hard-right ministers in the Netanyahu Government who want to renew the military assault.
And at this point, there is no sign of a Phase 2 for lasting arrangements for governance and security across Gaza. Nor is the scope of Israeli withdrawal clear.
Beyond Gaza, violence in the West Bank — including by Israeli settlers is escalating. The Netanyahu Government is likely to press ahead with the expansion of illegal settlements.
