Photo: European Defence Agency
Originally published, with an accompanying podcast, for Ideas on Europe on eu!radio:
In its 2022 Strategic Compass, the European Union envisaged a force of 5000 troops, including pre-identified strategic enablers, built on “substantially modified Battlegroups”.
The Rapid Deployment Capacity was proposed by 14 member states and had been discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council on Defence Issues in May 2021. The initiative gained traction after the EU states had to rely on the US for the hasty evacuation of their citizens from Afghanistan three months later.
Now the Russian invasion of Ukraine has focused minds in Brussels on military plans. But does the Rapid Deployment Capacity provide the EU with the necessary capabilities to respond quickly?
The EU Battlegroups, on which the RDC is based, have never been deployed despite being fully operational since 2007. They are still saddled with the issues of funding, composition, and political will.
Regarding funding, participating member states have to pick up the tab for most of the operational costs. The battlegroups are also small in size, just 1500 troops, limiting what they can do. While the EU has deployed several operations, the tasks were too large for a Battlegroup.
Member states have diverse views on when force should be deployed, including the ability to sustain different levels of risk; where force should be deployed, particularly as the primary location for Battlegroup deployments is largely focused on the African continent, which is not in every state’s interests; and with whom force is used, highlighting Atlanticist and Europeanist visions of European security.
The lack of political willingness is particularly evident in the rotation of the Battlegroups. In principle, two Battlegroups are on standby and rotated every six months, but there are no Battlegroups scheduled for the second half of 2023.
Still, there are advantages to the Battlegroups as they can facilitate military cooperation and training, the reorganization of national armed forces, and interoperability. This explains their continued existence even if they are not being used.
Is EU Rapid Reaction Capacity More Viable?
In terms of what is new, an extension of common costs, which are funded based on member states’ GDP, was explicitly stated within the Strategic Compass. However, no agreement has been reached, beyond agreeing to include the first live exercise for the RDC in Spain this year.
Structurally the RDC is larger; however, it is still based on two Battlegroups plus strategic enablers, raising the question if it is an increase in capability.
Importantly, however, it is modular, so the RDC can be tailored to the crisis to which it is responding. Its duration has also been increased to a year. Two operational scenarios, based on rescue and evacuation with an African focus, and the initial stabilization phase have been created. Further scenarios are in the pipeline.
Nonetheless, political will is needed to resolve the different visions of European security among member states. Ukraine has been a double-edged catalyst, as the focus of some countries is now on deterrence of Russia rather than the RDC. With NATO announcing a new force model of 300,000 troops, the question is elevated about who is willing to contribute to the RDC, through strategic enablers or fulfillment of the Battlegroup rota.
Fundamentally, even if common costs are expanded and a suitable scenario comes up, it will still depend on whose Battlegroups are on standby as to whether they will be deployed. Whilst the core idea is to make the RDC more attractive to member states, so that they are less likely to say “no” to deploying it, fundamental questions still need to be resolved.
“Nonetheless, political will is needed to resolve the different visions of European security among member states…………Whilst the core idea is to make the RDC more attractive to member states, so that they are less likely to say “no” to deploying it, fundamental questions still need to be resolved.”
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I think the core challenge here is the compatibility of national interests with the goals and objectives of supranational organisations – – namely NATO and the EU. Current heads-of-state who have the Euro-Atlanticist mindset appear to share the same vision as their counterparts in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which was not the case twenty years ago, when conflict arose between ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. The US, in the run-up to the Iraq War, exploited that division. So, I think the question is this: Can the center hold indefinitely? You mention the different visions these states have of European security. Another Chancellor Schroeder and a Jacques Chirac (or another Mitterrand) could put common security imperatives and objectives into question. Schroeder would not have thrown his country’s economy under the bus for Ukraine. Superimposed on all this is the challenge to the unipolar world order we are now witnessing, the relative and absolute/terminal decline of the US (the guarantor of that order), and the outdated European security framework that currently exists, which the Russians are now driving into the dustbin.
How can a rapid-reaction force be depended upon under such diverse/fluid security conditions and among states with such diversity of national interests? The US-NATO infighting during the Yom Kippur War might be a lesson to be learned from this as well. The prospects are worse today, now that NATO and the EU are much larger and unwieldy.