Abdurrahman Lam’e, a citizen journalist based near Damascus, writes for EA:


A new photo from the Islamic State’s “Wilayat Dimashq” (Damascus Province) outlet is significant. The importance is not in the image itself — the burning of a confiscated tobacco pile — because that has been seen on numerous occasions in Islamic State-controlled areas of Syria. Instead, the impact comes for the location, al-Qaser village near as-Suwayda city in southern Syria.

Having taken control of Bir al-Qasb town in the neighboring East Ghouta area in autumn 2014, Islamic State units are moving freely in northeastern Suwayda Province, mainly near the Khalkhalah airbase. A recent attack by its fighters on sites near the airbase killed at least 17 Syrian troops and pro-regime Palestinian militia.

Suwayda Province, 100 km (60 miles) south of Damascus and near the Jordanian border, is home to about half a million people of the Druze religion. The community evolved from Shia Islam but incorporates a series of beliefs from other faiths, philosophies, and beliefs. Its adherents are mainly located in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, with a smaller group in Jordan.

When Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970, he was keen on presenting himself as a protector of the minorities. These minorities — mainly Alawites, Druze, Christians, Shia, and Ismailis — compose about 20 to 25% of the population, in addition to Sunni Kurds. The history of Syria presents coexistence between the Sunni Muslim majority and minority faiths, but al-Assad had another motive: he wanted to create an alliance to block any Sunni-based challenge to his authority. This alliance expanded during the era of Bashar al-Assad to include a class of Sunni businessmen and clerics who enjoyed special financial and social privileges.

When the revolution started in 2011, the Assad regime linked this power base to a sectarian warning. In its propaganda, the regime was the defender of both a secular Syria and minority populations against a hard-line Islamic State, the only alternative to the Syrian system.

The Druze were caught up in this political game. If they sided with the opposition and rebels, they could be accused of betraying a regime that supposedly protected them. So while Suwayda has seen many small demonstrations during the revolution, they failed to change the general opinion of most Druze that detachment from the conflict was the best approach, even as the regime conscripted local youth and formed National Defense Forces militia in Suwayda.

However, as the NDF contend with a rebel advance across southern Syria and shortages of manpower, the regime has taken the risk of pressing more Suwayda men into military serivce. Many local notables in Suwayda have begun to protest Damascus’ use of their men and the dim prospect of any improvement in the situation.

Now the Islamic State’s advance from the desert to the borders of Suwayda has raised the stakes. On the one hand, the Assad regime will tell the Druze that this is the fulfillment of a dark prophecy of militant groups committing massacres and ordering the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, with those who refuse facing death.

But that message may only present the Druze leadership with two bad choices: to continue support of the regime in a war which does not have an end in sight or to be abandoned.

So a third option — unlikely through this four-year conflict — could arise. In recent weeks, rebels have also moved to the border of Suwayda province, taking the historic city of Busra al-Sham and the nearby Nassib crossing with Jordan. Could the Druze consider facing both the Islamic State and the regime through cooperation with the rebel factions?