As Monday’s deadline for a comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 Powers approaches, The New York Times has turned to scary headlines about Tehran’s deception and danger. “In Iran Talks, U.S. Seeks to Prevent a Covert Weapon“.

The story by David Sanger and William Broad claims that — despite the focus of the talks on Iran’s capacity for uranium enrichment and the status of known facilities — unnamed officials have another concern:

Unstated is the fear of an even more problematic issue, referred to as “sneakout.” That describes the risk of a bomb being produced at an undetected facility deep in the Iranian mountains, or built from fuel and components obtained from one of the few trading partners happy to do business with Tehran, like North Korea.

Sanger and Broad, used by US officials for years to claim that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, do not mention that “Possible Military Dimensions” are no longer a primary topic at the talks between Tehran and the 5+1 Powers. They do not refer to the repeated declarations of the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has found no diversion of uranium by Iran for a military program. They do not cite any evidence pointing to a “secret facility”.

Instead, they distort a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate — which assessed that Iran had halted pursuit of a militarized nuclear program in 2003 — by taking a single statement out of context.

They also claim that the US exposed the construction of the “secret” Fordoo uranium enrichment plant in 2009. Iran had informed the IAEA of the project before it was revealed by President Obama in a high-profile press conference just before nuclear talks in Geneva.

US officials — including former White House advisor Gary Samore, a named source in Sanger and Broad’s latest article — have said that Tehran only informed the IAEA because they know that Washington was about to expose their plans.

However, Sanger and Broad do not appear to have an exclusive with their “sneak-out” story. To the contrary, former US officials have been pushing the line for weeks.

In late September, Reuters headlined, “Big Powers Aim to Tackle Any Iran Bomb ‘Sneak-Out’ Risk in Nuclear Talks“. Fredrik Dahl, another favored outlet for those doubting Tehran’s intentions, opened with a statement which is almost the same as the lead in The New York Times:

Western strategists have long debated the specter of Iran “breaking out” – suddenly showing the ability to explode an atom bomb. But some see a “sneak-out” less visible to U.N. inspectors as a possibly bigger risk and world powers have calibrated their demands in negotiations with Iran to forestall any such outcome.

The resemblances with Sanger and Broad’s article do not end there. Dahl presents the same distortion of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate as concluding that the Islamic Republic “probably would use covert facilities…for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon”W.

And Dahl cites a former US official: “Under current circumstances, I believe that a ‘sneak-out’ from an undeclared enrichment facility is more a likely threat than a ‘break-out’ from a declared facility.”

The official? “Gary Samore, until last year the top nuclear proliferation expert on U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security staff”.

That would the same Gary Samore who wrote in his book in 2013: “There are several basic ‘sneak-out’ options [for Iran].”